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The changing nature of crisis and an increased expectancy of pandemics sets the stage for 
many challenging crisis’ in the future. Modernization and inequalities of a divided world also 
play a big role in this future, while organizational factors often are the ones being solely 
blamed for inadequate crisis management. A knowledge gap in combining crisis management 
literature with pandemic and epidemic response further complicates the ability to plausible 
predict how health crisis unfold and should be managed. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to explore, illustrate and seek a deeper understanding of 
pandemics through the lenses of crisis management. These lenses will tell the story of 
modernization, interconnectedness, governance, inequity, health systems, pig, bats, crisis 
management and an international harvester of blood. 
The thesis has been carried out through a comparative case study of H1N1 influenza in 
Norway and the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa. Reports by the United Nations, the World 
Health Organization, external management assessors and some news sources have been 
analyzed though a theoretical framework on transboundary crisis.  
Main findings include heavy reliance on the health sector, the World Health Organization as 
custodians of a crisis, international travel, deforestation, migration, land use, poverty and poor 
health systems create and facilitate pandemics, and solving a pandemic is in reality the 
solving of an epidemic in the diseased country. Furthermore, mechanisms for disease 
propagation, such as “deliberate uncertainty-making”, challenges in mobilizing people, 
money and goods, stigma associated with being the host country of a disease, lack of 
awareness of the different international frameworks between the health and humanitarian 
sectors and the failure to establish an authoritative narrative in communicating disease, have 
been identified. 
The fact that it only takes one infected child to almost force governments on their knees, 
launching national and international actions to combat an infectious disease, serves as a dire 
reminder of the importance in incorporating crisis management literature with pandemic and 
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“We have to bring in the science and rigour of crisis management 
on top of the science of epidemic response. Otherwise the risk is of 
being run by scientists and doctors and not people who know how 
to run an emergency”. 
Dr. Bruce Aylward, Special Representative of the 
Director-General for Ebola (WHOe, 2015, p. 221-222). 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study will explore the relationship between the H1N1 influenza in Norway and the Ebola 
outbreak in Western Africa. The changing nature of crisis’ and an increased expectancy in 
pandemics sets the stage for many challenging crisis’ in the future. Modernization and 
inequalities of a divided world also play a big role in this future, while organizational factors 
often are the ones being solely blamed for inadequate crisis management. 
Societies have always faced the risks of crisis, such as floods, forest fires, draughts and 
blizzards, some know examples even dating back 5000 to 6000 years (Quarantelli, Lagadec & 
Boin, 2007). As societies evolve they are introduced to new hazards and threats. Some come in 
the form of new technology, but maybe more important; some new threats and hazards arise 
from the interconnectedness we humans strive to achieve. By cooperating and growing 
interconnected we have accomplished wonders our ancestors would not even dream of, from 
harnessing the sunlight into pure energy, creating devices which potentially harbor all 
knowledge known to man, to being able to modify genetic materials for our own gains and so 
on. The list of human advances is endless. There are some backsides to this cooperation though 
– we are becoming more and more dependent on each other, and on systems and institutions to 
take care of us, especially when a crisis occur.  
Many crisis management scholars have long been aware that crisis are growing more 
complicated as the interconnectedness of the world is increasing. Many attempts have been 
made to define this new nature of crisis. One of the earliest was done by Quarantelli, Lagadec 
& Boin (2007), where they speak of “trans-system social ruptures” (p. 27). Later, Boin & 
Rhinard (2008) coin the term “transboundary threats” (p. 6-7) and “transboundary crisis” (p. 
4).  One result of such interconnectedness is emerging new diseases, as well as the spread of 
old ones. All these diseases are caused by a pathogen, which (literally) means a microorganism 
that can cause disease (Gunn, 2013). A disease that is usual or has a constant presence in a given 
geographical area is labeled as an endemic disease, such as seasonal influenza (Gunn, 2013; 
Porta, 2008). When a disease breaks this barrier of normal prevalence in a geographical area, it 
is labeled as an epidemic, and if this disease spreads across international borders, it is labeled a 
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pandemic (Gunn, 2013; Porta, 2008). These pathogens have become exceptionally adapted at 
using humans as a resource for their own gain. Often they lead to the demise, or at least to the 
cause of negative health implications, for the host. In fact, epidemics and pandemics accounted 
for almost two thirds of all deaths from natural disasters between the 1900’s and 2005 (Eshgi 
& Larson, 2008, p. 79). Recent mathematical modelling has shown that a disease could spread 
to all major global capitals within 60 days, and “kill more than 33 million people within 250 
days” (UN, 2016, p. 26). 
On average, pandemics appear every decade, but the frequency of global health threats is 
increasing (Ross, Crowe & Tyndall, 2015). More than 300 new communicable diseases are 
reported to have emerged between 1940 and 2004 alone (UN, 2016, p. 25). This growth is 
mainly caused by population expansion, older age, complex humanitarian emergencies, 
international travel, commerce, food processing, land use, and absent or ineffective health and 
surveillance systems (Noji, 2008, p. 226-228). Ross et. al. (2015) summarize that 
overpopulation and poverty are the main factors that contribute in creating better breeding 
grounds for epidemics and pandemics. Weak, malnourished urban populations in Low-and-
middle-income-countries is where pandemics are most likely to originate from. The UN 
predicts that the world will double its urban population by 2050, to the amount of 6 billion, 
where most of this increase will happen in Low-and-middle-income-countries (Ross et. al., 
2015, p. 90).  
There is a large amount of research on pandemics (and epidemics) from a medical and 
biological point of view, aiming at assessing potential health implications (Adivar & Selen, 
2013). In their review of 73 research papers, Adivar & Selen (2013) point out that control 
policies through vaccination and quarantine are the most proposed measures to respond to 
epidemics (p. 256). If the medical community, somewhat, agree on how to combat epidemics 
and pandemics, then why are epidemics and pandemics still mismanaged? While a virus is in 
fact the specific agent that is the cause of infection, that needs quarantine and vaccines to be rid 
of, it is important to also understand that a crisis is socially constructed and has sociopolitical 
dimensions (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003, p. 545; Canton, 2007). A virus can have a fixed set of 
properties, but if you are infected in a nation with superb health system, it is not the same as an 
infection in a nation with a poor health system. Absent surveillance systems, for example, can 
easily result in further spread of the disease, and if the conditions are right, a crisis is being 
born. 
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The initial quote by Dr. Bruce Aylward highlights the need for a marriage between crisis 
management literature and response to global health threats. This is also corroborated by Carney 
and Bennett (2014), which review how pandemic management is framed, and concludes that a 
more socio-political nuanced response to pandemics are needed (p. 145). 
Quarantelli et. al. (2007) maintains that it is more important to understand the conditions that 
can generate disasters and crisis, than it is to specify characteristics of the phenomena. 
Pandemics, and epidemics are first and foremost a crisis – not an illness to be cured. Of course, 
curing the disease is a big part of managing this kind of crisis, but there are still many other 
issues to be solved (e.g. uncertainty, surge capacities, coordination and public communication).  
1.1 PREVIOUS RESEARCH1 
The literature on crisis management in relation to pandemics is very varied due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of a crisis. This is especially true when global health is concerned, as 
health penetrates the whole of society. In my review I read research papers from the past 30 
years that had something to do with “epidemics” and “pandemics”. Three scientific journals 
regarding crisis management were chosen, bringing the total amount of research papers to 139. 
I did not include research from a medical point of view, because of the sheer amount of such 
literature, and because it has a different focus than crisis management research.  
Most of the research papers in my review only mention epidemics and pandemics briefly and 
had other areas of focus. Of the 139 research papers reviewed, 101 were about other themes 
and 14 were not related at all. Some research papers that were about management of pandemics 
and epidemics were done so in the context of Western societies. I would argue that these are 
not quite transferable to developing countries. Many of the poorer nations lack the necessary 
infrastructure or systems to manage health threats from, and thus is in need of international 
assistance (Benini & Bradford-Benini, 1996; Noji, 2008). I did, however, identify a few 
research papers that propose overarching models for natural hazards crisis management, where 
epidemics and pandemics were mentioned briefly. As these models are not built around 
empirical studies on epidemics or pandemics, but for example tsunami (Moe & Pathranarakul, 
2006) or flood (Moe, Gehbauer, Senitz & Mueller, 2007), I am reluctant to propose them as 
framework for pandemic and epidemic management.  
                                                                
1 For a more detailed literature review, see Appendix 1.0 
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The most relevant research papers for pandemic and epidemic management are about 
transboundary crisis (Ansell, Boin & Keller, 2010; Boin & Ekengren, 2009; Boin, Rhinard & 
Ekengren, 2014; Hermann & Dayton, 2009). The main message from this literature is that 
threats are becoming international, and that local threats can eventually cross national borders 
because of the growing interconnectedness in society. There is also the identification of some 
main challenges for managing such threats: coping with uncertainty, providing surge capacity, 
organizing a response and communicating with the public. (Ansell et. al, 2010). As with any 
crisis, they require rapid response under conditions of uncertainty and stress (Rosenthal, Charles 
& ‘t Hart, 1989), and Ansell et. al. (2010) argues that this becomes even harder when a crisis is 
spread across geographical borders and policy boundaries, and when there is an involvement of 
many response actors. 
The transboundary crisis theory does not focus on pandemics or epidemics explicitly, but it is 
meant to be a theory on crisis that have global proportions, and as such, pandemics are a part 
of these kind of crisis. Explorative research and discussion around the theory itself have been 
done, but this it is somewhat sparse (Ansell et. al., 2010; Boin, 2009; Boin & Rhinard, 2008; 
Galaz, Moberg, Olsson, Paglia & Parker, 2011; Olsson & Zhong, 2010; Quarantelli, Lagadec 
& Boin, 2007; Watchendorf, 2009). Much of this research highlight how societal interpretations 
and social settings are important for response in crisis. For example, in context of helping others 
outside of one’s own immediate group it ranges from no help at all to full help (Quarantelli et. 
al., 2007). The authors point out that in societies with great ethnic and racial differences, 
volunteering to help others outside one’s own circle is almost unknown (p. 32). The main point 
being that different culture can have various impacts on crisis management.  
There is a substantial knowledge gap in combining crisis management to pandemic response. I 
did not identify any empirical studies on operative management of pandemics in the field. 
Neither could I identify studies where theoretical frameworks were applied to study these 
phenomena. As there currently is not much of a scientific debate or schools of thoughts 
regarding crisis management and pandemics, it shows that there is a need for going in depth 
and explore pandemics with the lenses of crisis management literature. 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The aim of my thesis will not be to generalize findings or provide predictions, but to “explore, 
illuminate and seek understanding”, as often is the aim in any qualitative research (Golafshani, 
2003, p. 600). Taking note of Quarantelli et. al. (2007), I believe it is important to understand 
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that differences in culture can produce various differences in crisis management. I would argue 
that to illustrate such factors it is reasonable to compare the pandemic management in two very 
different cultural contexts. Also, as identified earlier, it is the poorer developing nations who 
will experience an increase in health threats. An exploration of management in such countries 
could be interesting to compare with management in nations that are more developed, to see 
how management challenges unfolds differently. Thus, the comparison will be between a highly 
developed Western society, Norway, and the three countries most affected by Ebola: Guinea, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia in Western Africa. These nations are some of least developed in the 
world (UN, 2016).  The logic behind choosing Norway for comparison will be further explained 
in the discussion on case selection in the method chapter. The research problem captures the 
main essence of my aim in this thesis: 
What different reasons for pandemics, and mechanisms for disease propagation, can be 
identified between the H1N1influenza in Norway, and the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa? 
In order to answer the research problem, I will first need to confirm that both the H1N1 
pandemic and the Ebola outbreak are comparable. Second, there is a need for mapping the 
relationship between Norway and West Africa, and reasons for why the pandemic occurred. 
Further, a mapping of core challenges needs to be done. These challenges actively hinder the 
management of the pandemics, and in effect, serve as mechanisms for disease propagation. 
With this information, it is possible to give an overview of the mechanisms that can cause 
disease propagation, in Norway and West Africa, respectively. Because of these three needs I 
have broken down and operationalized the research problem into more specific research 
questions: 
To what extent is the H1N1 influenza in Norway and the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa 
comparable? 
What is the relationship between the reasons for the H1N1 influenza pandemic in Norway, and 
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa? 
What were the mechanisms that made disease propagation possible? 
 
My hopes are, in addition to providing in depth exploration on pandemics, that I can contribute 
in the uncharted area of crisis that cross international borders – or the “terra incognita” of a 
transboundary crisis, as Arjen Boin (2009, p. 375) labels it.  
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The Structure of the Thesis 
To answer the research question, I will empirically investigate the World Health Organizations2 
(WHO) and the host countries’ management of the Ebola pandemic, and compare it with the 
H1N1 influenza management in Norway. The comparison will be done through developing a 
framework of analysis, extracted from theory on crisis development and termination, why 
pandemics originate, and theory on the transboundary crisis. To the best of my knowledge, no 
study on pandemics with transboundary crisis theory as framework have been done. 
A detailed method chapter will highlight some of the main challenges in case studies. Every 
research question will be discussed by comparing the differences between Norway and the West 
African countries, with the aim of highlighting the research problem. In the end, I will provide 
an overview of the main differences identified between Norway and Western Africa.  
2.0 THEORY 
This chapter aims to give a quick overview of how a crisis can be scaled, highlight a problem 
with the WHO and timeframes, and give an overview of core challenges. In the end I will 
present some common question that is derived from the theory, which constitutes the analytical 
framework for this thesis.  
Ansell, Boin & Keller (2010) have developed a framework that identifies some key concepts 
and challenges for managing transboundary crisis. A crisis can be explained with a perceived 
threat against core values or life-sustaining functions of a social system, which requires urgent 
response under conditions of uncertainty (Rosenthal et. al., 1989). A transboundary crisis can, 
in addition to Rosenthal et. al. (1989), be characterized like this: “they affect multiple 
jurisdictions, undermine the functioning of various policy sectors and critical infrastructure, 
escalate rapidly and morph along the way” (Ansell et. al., 2010, p. 195). 
2.1 THE TRANSBOUNDARY SCALE 
A crisis can be put on a “transboundary scale” based on three dimension. The higher the crisis 
score on each of these dimensions, the more transboundary it becomes, and the more difficult 
it becomes to manage (Ansell et. al., 2010). 
The first dimension is related to whether a crisis can move vertically and horizontally regarding 
responsibilities and management. If, for example, lower levels of government are overwhelmed, 
                                                                
2 Why the WHO? See Appendix – 2.0 
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the local authorities may need resources from higher up, thus the crisis move vertically upwards 
(Ansell et. al., 2010). The crisis can also spread horizontally across political jurisdictions on the 
same level of government. The second dimension involves the ability a crisis has to jump into, 
or between different sectors, or functional borders. For example, a crisis can jump from only 
affecting the industrial and transportation sector, and into sectors such as financial, health or 
electricity. The third dimension relates to the timeframe of a crisis. Many crises are clearly 
defined by a beginning and an end, however some crisis has deep roots and must be managed 
for years before sufficiently being dealt with (Ansell et. al. 2010).  
There is something special in international health regarding a crisis’ timeframe though. The 
WHO is the authority on framing a health threat as a “Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern” (WHO, 2011). As such, they are also the authority on defining the timeframe for the 
crisis. This could make the data collection and discussion around timeframe to be only centered 
around what the WHO define as a crisis, and not what crisis management theory could provide 
instead. Because of this I created a subchapter on its own, where I use alternative theory to 
revisit the notion of timeframe for a crisis. 
2.2 TIMEFRAME REVISITED  
To understand how a crisis developed, we have to look at its (most probable) source. As 
mentioned in the introduction: overpopulation, older age, poverty, food processing, land use, 
international travel and absent or ineffective health and surveillance systems are the main 
factors that contribute in creating pandemics (Noji, 2008; Ross et. al., 2015).  
‘t Hart & Boin (2001) have developed a framework for different typologies of crisis. These 
typologies can mainly be divided in four:  
1.) The fast-burning crisis – This kind of crisis has an instantaneous development, and an 
abrupt termination. 
2.) The cathartic crisis – A crisis that develops slowly, but has a quick termination.   
3.) The slow-burning crisis – Develops slowly, and is also gradually terminated. 
4.) The long-shadow crisis – As with fast-burning they develop quickly, but they are very 
slowly terminated.  
t’ Hart & Boin (2001) emphasize that crisis can be within more than one category, from what 




2.3 CORE CHALLENGES 
When a crisis has been defined as transboundary, one can identify four core challenges. These 
are common in any crisis, but are more challenging in crisis that are transboundary (Ansell et. 
al., 2010). These challenges are mainly divided into: coping with uncertainty, providing surge 
capacity, organizing a response and communicating with the public. 
2.3.1 COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY 
Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort (2001) states that a defining characteristic of any crisis is 
uncertainty. This uncertainty is related to the specific nature of the threat, to peoples initial and 
emergent response, the dynamics of the situation and to the future consequences of the crisis. 
Ansell et. al (2010) categorize uncertainty in three different forms: 
- Uncertainty about the source of the problem. 
- Uncertainty about the evolution of the problem. 
- Uncertainty about possible solutions. 
2.3.2 PROVIDING SURGE CAPACITY  
When the response organizations are pushed beyond their normal resources, they often need an 
increased capacity for response (Ansell et. al., 2010). While this seems like a very overarching 
statement, one can identify some main capacity needs, at least when health is concerned. In any 
health crisis there will be extra needs for in-hospital and out-of-hospital care, in addition to a 
higher need for medical assets – e.g. medical supplies and laboratories (Barbisch & Koenig, 
2006). The authors do also recognize that a full assessment of functional areas in health care 
will include other areas such as (including, but not limited to), command and control, 
communications systems, stress management, preventive medicine and public health, 
laboratory, mortuary affairs and funeral services, personnel, logistics, transportation, and 
veterinary services (Barbisch & Koenig, 2006). 
2.3.3 ORGANIZING A RESPONSE 
One of the greatest challenges in crisis management, and even more so in a transboundary crisis, 
is to first mobilize people, money and goods, and then coordinate them. This is often referred 
to as “coordinated mobilization” (Ansell et. al., 2010, p. 199).  
Particularly for transboundary crisis two coordination challenges arises. The first is inter-
jurisdiction coordination, both horizontally and vertically. This means that a city or region 
might have to, willingly or unwillingly, cooperate with another city or region. Information is 
most likely to flow between jurisdictions and organizations that have prior knowledge of each 
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other, and that have routine interactions with each other (Ansell et. al., 2010). Vertically, there 
needs to be a coordination both upward and downward within the response actor (Ansell et. al., 
2010). The second type of coordination challenge is the inter-sectoral coordination. This creates 
difficulties for management, because the different sectors often “involve systems with different 
logics and operating imperatives” (Ansell et. al., 2010, p. 196).  
2.3.4 COMMUNICATING WITH THE PUBLIC 
The authorities sit on raw data in form of reports, rumors and situational pictures. This 
unprocessed data provides difficulties in conveying correct information the right way (Ansell 
et. al., 2010). Regarding outbreak of diseases, the WHO (2008) has developed a framework of 
principles, which are built on “evidence-based, field-tested communication guidance that would 
promote the public health goal of rapid outbreak control with the least possible disruption to 
society” (p. 5). 
1. Trust – A key principle is to communicate in a way that builds, maintains and restores 
trust between the public and outbreak managers.  
2. Announcing early – By being proactive, and communizing a real or potential health risk 
is crucial. If those affected are alerted correctly it can minimize an infectious disease 
threat.  
3. Transparency – Giving timely and complete information of a real or potential risk and 
its management will maintain trust. 
4. Listening – Understanding the public’s risk perceptions, views and concerns is critical 
to effective communication and the broader emergency management function it 
supports.  
5. Planning – Public communication during an outbreak represents an enormous challenge 
for any public health authority and therefore demands sound planning, in advance, to 
adhere to the principles described above.  
 
2.4 COMMON SET OF QUESTIONS 
The development of a framework for analysis has been done by deriving questions from the 
theory chapter. The first set “The transboundary scale”, is in place to identify and define to 
what grade different transboundary crisis can be deemed as equal, in this case the H1N1 
influenza in Norway and the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa. The second set “Timeframe 
revisited” is used to explain the main reasons as to why pandemics occur, and to possibly 
identify some differences in reasons between a developed and some developing nations. The 
third and final set of questions “Core challenges”, defines what core challenges that are typical 
for a transboundary crisis. For example, what role uncertainty plays or what is the challenges 
in organizing a response. The core challenges serve as mechanisms for disease propagation. 
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The questions are supposed to be on an overarching level, so that they can be used for any cases 
of pandemics, without much adjustments. These questions are presented in Table 1.0 – 
Common set of questions. 
Table 1 – Common set of questions 
The transboundary scale Timeframe revisited Core challenges 
Vertical and horizontal dimension 
Which levels of government were 
affected by the crisis? 
Were there spread of political 




Did the crisis affect different 
sectors, crossing functional 
borders? 
Timeframe 
Does the crisis have a clear 
beginning and end? 
Is it possible to 




At what pace did the 
pandemic develop? 
At what pace did the 
pandemic get 
terminated? 
Coping with uncertainty 
Was there uncertainty about: 
- The source of the crisis 
- The evolution of the crisis 
- Solutions to the crisis? 
Providing surge capacity  




Organizing a response 
Were there challenges in coordinating with 
other cities or regions? 
Were there challenges in coordinating upwards 
and downwards within the response actor? 
Were there challenges in coordinating with 
other sectors? 
Communicating with the public 
Were there challenges in conveying rumors, 




In this chapter I will provide explanations into the reason for choosing qualitative research 
method, how my comparative case study is built up and done, and how I have tried to solve 
some of the common pitfalls in case studies. Special focus on innovations in comparative 
method have been emphasized. Later, there is an overview of my data sources, which includes 
my own version of a “informant list” of the documents used in the study. There is also a general 
assessment of some drawbacks in only using secondary and tertiary data sources. Last, the very 
concept of measuring quality in qualitative research, and how reliability and validity are not the 
best measures for this will be discussed. An alternative to assessing quality will be applied. 
3.1 QUALITATIVE METHOD, CASE STUDIES AND COMPARISON 
My choice fell on qualitative method for studying the relationship between the pandemic in 
Norway and Western Africa. Qualitative method is flexible, goes in depth and often tries to 
understand social phenomena; choosing this method makes it possible to acquire profound and 
unique data (Ringdal, 2009; Thagaard, 2002). As I showed initially, there is a great lack of in 
depth research on pandemics, where the focus is on crisis management. Unlike quantitative 
research which often seeks to establish determination, prediction and generalization 
(Golafshani, 2003), I seek illumination, understanding and exploration of crisis management in 
pandemics. Many researchers have pointed out that case studies are appropriate to use when 
searching for a deep insight into events (Andersen, 2003; Johannessen, Tufte & Christoffersen, 
2010; Yin, 2014). Furthermore, comparisons bring forth similarities and contrasts, and thus 
sharpens the power of description; it is a fundamental tool for analysis (Collier, 1993). Although 
case studies have a widespread usage, there is great confusion regarding what a case study is, 
and how it should be defined within social sciences (Ragin, 1987, in Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999). 
Furthermore, there are confusion around the terms “case”, “case study” and “case study 
method”.  
The comparative study 
One of the dominant definitions of a case study is Yin (1994), which states that it is an 
“empirical inquiry” into a phenomenon and its context, and that the study relies on “multiple 
sources of evidence” (p. 13). For my purposes, I will use different definitions set forth by 
George (1979), Bennett (2004) and Kaarbo & Beasley (1999) in their review of various 
definitions and uses of “case study” in academia, respectively. Kaarbo & Beasley (1999) define 
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a case “to be an instance, or data point…” (p. 372). For example, “experimentally derived 
measurements, survey responses, or classifications of historical events…” (p. 372). George 
(1979), historian, reviewer and early developer of comparative method, labels “a case” (along 
somewhat the same lines) as an instance of a class of events of interest to the investigator. A 
“case study” is a “well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the investigator selects for 
analysis, rather than a historical happening itself” (Bennett, 2004, p. 21). Kaarbo & Beasley 
(1999) adds that a case study is the “empirical examination of a real world phenomenon within 
its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulation of either the phenomenon or the 
context” (p. 372). Pandemics are instances, data points and a class of events that is of interest 
to study. The “case study” in itself is the crisis management of pandemics, that is possible to 
study without manipulation of either the phenomenon or the context it is happening in. Finally, 
Kaarbo & Beasley (1999) tells that “comparative case study is the systematic comparison of 
two or more data points (cases) obtained through use of the case study method” (p. 372).  
There are many ways to perform case studies, but one of the oldest and most used method is 
through focused and structured comparison (Bennett, 2004; George, 1979; George & Bennett, 
2004; Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999). The method, proposed by George (1979), is focused meaning 
that is deals selectively with only certain aspects of the case, and structured, meaning that 
general questions are employed to guide the data collection. 
Pitfalls and research design 
George & Bennett (2004) summarize three areas of common pitfalls in case studies, which 
include “case section bias” (p. 22), “identifying scope conditions and necessity” (p. 25) and the 
“degrees of freedom problem” (p. 28). Case selection bias can lead to the researcher selecting 
a case that is not representative for the phenomenon he or she wants to investigate, and instead 
a case that only the researcher perceives as appropriate (George & Bennett, 2004). If I were to 
investigate only the Norwegian H1N1 pandemic, for example, many aspects of crisis 
management during a pandemic could be lost, or the potential explanatory variables possible to 
identify could number in the thousands. A workaround to this problem has been identified by 
Collier (1993), on strategically choosing cases, which I will come back to later on the “degrees 
of freedom problem”.  
Next, “identifying scope and necessity” tells that case studies are only able to make “tentative 
conclusions” on how much variables affect the outcomes in cases (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 
25). By defining the purpose of the study, it will have implications for this problem. Mainly the 
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purposes with case studies can be divided into using cases for description of a phenomenon, 
cases to develop theory, cases to explore and refine theory, cases as tests of the theory or using 
theory to explore cases (Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999). If one were to use the last typology, Levy 
(2008), reviewer of case studies, would name it a theory-guided idiographic case study. Being 
idiographic the study aims to “describe, explain, interpret and/or understand” (p. 4), and being 
theory-guided “focuses attention on some theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects 
other” (p. 4). In other words, using theoretical variables to provide some explanation as to why 
something happened. While this is not a definite workaround of assessing the importance of all 
relevant variables, it shows that by choosing the variables that is to be studied, one has greater 
ability to assess conclusions of at least the variables used.  
The third pitfall identified by George & Bennett (2004), the degree of freedom problem, is 
thoroughly discussed in Levy (2008). He points out that one of the greatest criticism against 
qualitative case study is that the number of variables investigated often exceed the number of 
cases, creating what is called “the problem of degrees of freedom” (Levy, 2008, p. 10). This 
makes is hard for the researcher to judge whether or not the theory plausibly predicts something, 
or if it was just a coincidence. Collier (1993) outlines three innovations in comparative method, 
which serves as a workaround, or decrease, of degrees of freedom; in effect: many of the pitfalls 
identified by George & Bennett (2004) also. All innovations have been employed in this study. 
First, Collier (1993) maintains that the simplest way to avoid too many degrees of freedom is 
to include more cases. Thus, it has been employed the use of a second case for comparison with. 
The second way of decreasing too many degrees of freedom is to “focus on comparable cases” 
(Collier, 1993, p. 111). Przeworski & Teune (1970, in Collier, 1993) and Przeworski (1987, in 
Collier, 1993) suggests using a contrasting case, because with cases that are very much alike 
they fail to eliminate rival explanations. If I compared only Liberia and Sierra Leone, for 
example, there is the possibility that hidden variables will not be discovered. Thus, countries 
that is perceived as differing greatly have been applied in this study. Strategically choosing a 
case from a set of predetermined notions, effectively also is a workaround the case section bias 
identified by George and Bennett (2004). At least the individual researchers bias towards 
choosing cases they perceive as interesting will be reduced, and instead the researcher will be 
connected to a larger universe of bias. My selection bias is connected to the logic on how to 
create understating through strategically choosing cases that differ, as identified by Przeworski 
& Teune (1970, in Collier, 1993). 
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The last step in decreasing degrees of freedom is by reducing the number of variables through 
either the combination of variables, or the employment of a theoretical framework. Such a 
framework focuses on a smaller number of explanatory factors (Collier, 1993). The latter 
approach was chosen for this study, as it would also be a workaround of the problem in 
assessing the importance of variables (George & Bennett, 2004). Thus, a theoretical framework 
for the analysis was developed, using “theory to explore cases” (Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999, p. 
374), falling within the typology of a “theory-guided idiographic study” (Levy, 2008, p. 4) and 
using the method of structured, focused comparison as proposed by George (1979). 
Summarized shortly (and without the methodological concepts), my thesis will be done through 
comparison of the crisis management aspect during the H1N1 influenza in Norway and the 
Ebola outbreak in the three most affected countries in Western Africa. A basis for comparison, 
through a theoretical framework, have been employed to be able to focus on only certain aspects 
of the pandemic – avoiding an overload of competing variables. These variables are then 
compared and discussed, according to theory. 
3.2 SOURCES OF DATA  
In my thesis, I have mainly used reports and documents to collect information. Documents can 
be the objects of study in themselves, but in my thesis, documents are used as resources to 
collect information about my research questions. I have used reports, documents and 
assessments of the Norwegian management of the H1N1 influenza, and the West African and 
the WHOs management of the Ebola outbreak. Blaikie (2010) refers to this as the use of societal 
artefacts as data sources. These sources are directly and indirectly left behind as results of 
individuals or groups doing activities in their natural setting. The collection of data was done 
through a subjective assessment of the documents relevance, at least when the official 
documents were concerned. This is what Blaikie (2010) defines as purposive or judgmental 
sampling. The news sources were more randomly collected. The sources of data I used, 
particularly the different reports from the UN, the WHO and the DSB, were so extensive that I 
easily reached a point of saturation, where the data I collected started getting repeated.  
Studies that involve interviews, or observation, often have some kind of assessment of the 
researcher’s influence on collecting data, and general notes on this way of collecting data. 
Grønmo (2004) points out that “a document, or text, has to be seen from its context in order to 
see if it is authentic and relevant” (p. 190). This seems quite overarching, and prone to much 
subjectivity when assessing. 
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Thus, I have employed my own scheme for assessing the quality of documents. This has been 
done through a framework developed in historical studies of documents. The framework is 
based on examination of Nazi propaganda during World War II, and is still used in historical 
studies to assess “evidentiary worth” of documents. (George, 1959; George & Bennett, 2004, 
p. 99-100). The main points are that, in order to interpret the meaning and significance of 
something that is communicated, it is important to ask questions about who is speaking to 
whom, for what purposes and under what circumstances (George, 1959, p. 107-121). From this 
I created a table which includes the main elements in assessing evidentiary worth. The purpose 
of this table is to serve as a “informant list” usually seen in chapters on interviews and 
observations, giving the reader greater ability to assess the quality of the documents used. The 
documents are presented in Table 2.0 – Documents used in the empirical investigation. 
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Table 2 – Documents used in the empirical investigation 
 
Author, year published, and document title Who is speaking? Message to whom? What purpose? Under what circumstances? 
Carlsen, L. (2009). The Great Swine Flu Cover-Up News source Regular readers Assign blame None special, except economic 
incentives 
CDC (2009). Outbreak of Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) 
Virus Infection – Mexico, March, April 2009 
Semi-International 
health governor 
The public Explanations and 
overview 
Need for overview 
DSB (2010). Ny influensa A (H1N1) 2009 Assessor of safety 
and contingency 
The public in Norway, 
but open for everyone 
Assessment National scrutiny 
Fauci, A. S. (2014). Ebola – Underscoring the Global 
Disparities in Health Care Resources 
Independent 
researcher 
Mostly researchers, but 
also interested public 
Assessment of 
global disparities 
Standard peer review processes 
Farrar, J. J., & Piot, P. (2014). The Ebola Emergency – 
Immediate Action, Ongoing Strategy 
Independent 
researchers 
Mostly researchers, but 
also interested public 
Explanation and 
assessment of Ebola 
Standard peer review processes 
Foley, S. (2009). For La Gloria, the stench of blame is from 
pig factories 
News source Regular readers Assign blame None special, except economic 
incentives 
Lacey, M. (2009). From Èdgar, Choughs Heard round the 
World 
News source Regular readers Spark attention None special, except economic 
incentives 
Knox, R. (2009). Inside The New Flu Virus News source Regular readers Provide 
explanations 
None special, except economic 
incentives 
López-Cervantes, M., Venado, A., Moreno, A., Pacheco- 
Domínguez, R., & Ortega-Pierres, G. (2009). On the Spread 
of the Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Virus in Mexico 
Independent 
researchers 
Mostly researchers, but 
also interested public 
Assessment of 
H1N1 
Standard peer review processes 
Kaplan, K. (2009). Origins of the Swine Flu News source Regular readers Provide 
explanations 
None special, except economic 
incentives 
Masterson, K. (2009). Where Did the Swine Flu Come from? News source Regular readers Provide 
explanations 
None special, except economic 
incentives 
Morales, A. T. (2009). Granjas Carroll provocó la epidemia de 
males respiratorios en Perote, según agente municipal 
News source Regular readers. 
Focused in Mexico 
Assign blame None special, except economic 
incentives 
Niang, C. I. (2014). Ebola: une épidémie postcoloniale Independent 
researcher 
Mostly researchers, but 
also interested public 
Assessment of 
culture in Africa 
Standard peer review processes 
Philpott, T. (2009). Swine-flu outbreak could be linked to 
Smithfield factory farms 
News source Mainly regular readers, 
but open to public 
Assign blame None special, except economic 
incentives 
RationalWiki (2016). List of conspiracy theories Collector of anything 
(ir)rational 
Those interested Giving overviews None special 
UN (2016). Protecting Humanity from Future Health Crisis – 










WHO (2008). World Health Organization Outbreak 













end of pandemic 
International scrutiny 
































WHOc (2015). One year into the Ebola epidemic: a deadly, 
























WHO (2016). WHO Director-General briefs media on 






end of pandemic 
International scrutiny 
WHO Ebola Response Team (2014). Ebola Virus Disease in 
West Africa – The First 9 Months of the Epidemic and 
Forward Projections 
WHO Ebola response 
team 
Mostly researchers, but 
also interested public 
Assessment of the 
Ebola virus 
Standard peer review processes 
* “During its special session on the Ebola emergency in January 2015, the Executive Board adopted resolution EBSS3.R1, in which, inter alia, it requested an interim assessment, 
by a panel of outside independent experts, on all aspects of WHOs response to the Ebola outbreak” (WHOd, 2015, p. 9). 
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Drawbacks 
A drawback of using only secondary and tertiary sources is the challenge of judging the quality 
of the data (Blaikie, 2010). Although I have provided a framework for assessing evidentiary 
worth regarding documents and texts, having my own raw data would strengthen the thesis. 
Also, the report written by the international agencies are also the ones that have defining powers 
in framing what is important. As such, some information they perceive as not important might 
have been left out. That being said, some of the best experts, researchers and assessors have 
been part in producing those reports, while being under international scrutiny. One wrongdoing 
and the whole report might be deemed as incorrect. Because of this, the secondary and tertiary 
data that have been used from the UN, the WHO, the DSB and all the independent assessors, I 
would argue are of very high quality. One of the reports published by the WHO (WHOd, 2015) 
were assessed by a panel of independent experts, which further strengthens the quality of this 
document. 
Another drawback is that the aim of the persons conducting data collection does not have the 
same aim with their research as I have (Blaikie, 2010). While this is a valid point, it is also 
double edged. The lack of similarity between my aim and the data sources I have used actually 
ensures a greater neutrality from my side, since I am unable to influence the data collection 
process in the same way as often seen in qualitative analysis (e. g. subjectivity, interpretations, 
halo-effects, forced questions and so on). Then again, the initial data collection by the assessors 
were to some degree influenced by such pitfalls. 
3.3 QUALITY IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
To test the quality of studies, one can try to achieve reliability, internal validity and external 
validity (Yin, 2014). Whittmore, Chase & Mandle (2001), in their review of the concepts of 
reliability and validity, points out that they stem directly from quantitative research. As such 
the concept are tried to be used with the same standards of quality testing as in “positivistic 
philosophy” (p. 523). The idea of reliability is a “concept used for test or evaluating quantitative 
research”, but is often used in “in all kinds of research” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 601). Validity 
also finds its roots in a “positivist tradition” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 599).  The problem is that 
most qualitative research is not within a positivist tradition, but more towards an interpretive 
line of thought. Whittmore et. al. (2001) underline that “the type of knowledge that the different 
approaches generate and the different philosophical perspectives on reality” poses questions if 
it is appropriate to use similar standards of quality testing in qualitative and quantitative 
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research (p. 524). As an example, Whittmore et. al. (2001) points out that the “important 
distinction between internal and external validity in quantitative research” are somewhat 
pointless within a research tradition where “generalization to populations in not a significant 
research goal” (Whittmore et. al., 2001, p. 524). The authors maintain that the nature of 
“qualitative research is contextual and subjective versus generalizable and objective”, as such 
it is not appropriate to use quantitative criteria as quality indicators for qualitative research (p. 
524). Golafshani (2003) points out that some researchers even go as far as implying that in any 
qualitative studies that include the notion of reliability the study will always be deemed as not 
good (p. 601). Point being that reliability refers to stability in measurements, which is almost 
impossible in qualitative research. The use of quantitative measures of quality in qualitative 
research is even by some researchers perceived as a “procedural charade” (Kahn, 1993, in 
Whittmore et. al. 2001, p. 524). 
As I have pointed out earlier, the aim of my study has never been to generalize findings, provide 
predictions or aggregate evidence; this is a qualitative study, which focuses on exploration, 
illumination and to seek understanding.  
How to measure quality then? 
Although validity and reliability might be, as regarded by a growing number of researchers, 
poor measures of quality in qualitative research, there is still a need for assessing the quality of 
the research done. Without quality checks there is the risk of falling within the realms of pseudo-
science. Whittmore et. al. (2001) reconceptualize the notion of testing quality in qualitative 
research by a synthesis of critique on quality measures, and different new proposal for the 
concept set forth by researchers throughout the years. The new measurement of quality can 
mainly be divided into primary and secondary criteria. Primary criteria are necessary to all 
qualitative inquiry, these include credibility, authenticity, criticality, and integrity (Whittmore 
et. al., 2001, p. 529). Secondary criteria provide further measures of quality and are considered 
to be more flexible in their use. These criteria include explicitness, vividness, creativity, 
thoroughness, congruence, and sensitivity (Whittmore et. al., 2001, p. 529). Through these 
criteria both reliability and validity, and other important aspects, such as writing style and 
ethics, are meant to be covered. The intentions of this framework is to give a better measure of 
quality than it would through just the reliability and validity concepts, as copied from 
quantitative approach. These new set of criteria frees the study from the shackles of the 
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positivistic research paradigm quality measures, as using a theory-guided idiographic case 
study are much closer to the paradigm of the interpretivist and qualitative research.  
3.3.1 PRIMARY CRITERIA OF QUALITY 
This chapter will cover the criteria that are necessary in all qualitative research to achieve 
quality in research: credibility, authenticity, criticality, and integrity. 
Credibility and authenticity  
Credibility is the conscious effort to establish confidence in an accurate interpretation of the 
meaning of the data (Whittmore et. al, 2001, p. 530). In other word, does my results reflect the 
real world phenomenon, or if my interpretations revel truths external to my investigation. 
Through the use of a developed theory as framework and the choosing of different cases to 
investigate the phenomenon it has strengthened the credibility of my findings. A careful 
description of pitfalls in the case study method has been given, with ways I tried to work around 
them. The aim of this was to reduce the conditions that can negatively affect the credibility of 
the thesis, and also give the reader the ability to assess credibility for themselves. 
Through the use of an “informant list” I have tried to provide the reader with greater ability to 
assess the authenticity of my findings. Authenticity, which is closely linked to credibility, 
relates to the portrayals of meanings that the sources of information experienced (Whittmore 
et. al, 2001, p. 530).  
Criticality and integrity 
Because interpretations, assumptions and knowledge background of investigators are 
potentially infinite, it is easy to both consciously and subconsciously influence the research 
(Whittmore et. al., 2001, p. 531). The research design needs to be portrayed in such a way that 
critical appraisal of one’s own design is shown, for example through discussion on exploring 
instances and biases. The method chapter has been done with complete openness on how my 
study has been built and why the design is a theory-guided idiographic case study. 
Integrity means that it has to be shown how the interpretations are valid and grounded within 
the data, as such the investigators should try to be self-critical at each phase of inquiry 
(Whittmore et. al., 2001, p. 531). Although I have tried to make it clear throughout empirical 
investigation and discussion how my claims have been made, those part could probably have 
been more separated for a greater overview of what is hard data, and what is discussion thereof. 
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In my opinion, this would not fit the writing style of my thesis, as such a separation leads to 
much repetition; the result being that the thesis loses some of the flow that I have tried to create 
between, and within, chapters. 
3.3.2 SECONDARY CRITERIA OF QUALITY  
This chapter covers the secondary criteria of validity, while not as broad as the primary criteria, 
they are important standards of quality identified in the literature (Whittmore et. al., 2001, p. 
531). These criteria are explicitness, thoroughness, congruence, vividness, creativity and 
sensitivity. 
Explicitness, thoroughness and congruence 
These criteria are more related to the reliability part of the thesis. In my study, I have provided 
an introduction to the area of problem and justification for choosing my research problem. An 
overview of the complete literature review has been provided, so that the reader themselves can 
assess if I chose the most appropriate theoretical framework. Common set of questions derived 
from the theory has also been presented, for the reader to question what was the basis for 
empirical investigation and discussion. This shows explicitness, which relates to the ability to 
follow the interpretive effort of the investigator, meaning that the interpretations and 
methodological decision and are accounted for, resulting in insight into the researcher’s 
judgements (Whittmore et. al., 2001, p. 531). 
Thoroughness can be understood as the comprehensiveness of the data and how well the 
approach and analysis is performed, leading up to what is called saturation (Whittmore et. al., 
2001, p. 532). I did not only base my empirical investigation on one agency, or even only the 
crisis management aspect of pandemics. There is used news sources, researcher with their own 
aims, independent assessors, assessors of policy, assessor of crisis management and assessors 
of culture.  
I have tried to rigidly use the research aim and questions as foundations for the entire thesis. 
Through the use of qualitative method, I use one key tool for getting in depth, which is the case 
study. Furthermore, I employed a theoretical framework for better in depth explanatory power 
during the empirical discussion. Also, the subchapters in the theory chapter, fits the research 
questions and the empirical investigation and discussion part. This is an attempt at achieving 
congruence, meaning that research question, the method, and the findings should match each 
other (Whittmore et. al., 2001, p. 532).  
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Vividness, creativity and sensitivity 
These criteria are more linked to writing style and ethics, but are none the less indicators of 
quality in qualitative research. Through portrayal of the phenomenon the reader should 
personally experience and understand the phenomenon or context described, although it is 
important to describe without overwhelming the reader with excessive detail (Whittmore et. al., 
2001, p. 531). I have tried to balance theoretical and methodological concepts with a nuanced 
language, although it is not so easy to achieve this. Furthermore, I have tried to build my thesis 
more like a story, and to ensure flow in and between chapters.  
Creativity, which probably is not the strongest aspect of my study, is demonstrated through 
being able to answer research questions through methodological design, while having flexibility 
within the inquiry design, imaginative ways of organizing, presenting and analyzing data. 
Although it must still be grounded in the scientific process (Whittmore et. al., 2001, p. 532). 
Ways creativity can be shown is through the development of models, but this has not been done 
in this study, as I do not want to force something that is not present throughout my data. 
Sensitivity is tightly linked with ethics, and as I did not interview, observe or use sensitive 
documents, questions about ethics have not been addressed in my study. The criterion regards 
if the research has been sensitive to human nature, cultural, and social contexts (Whittmore et. 
al., 2001, p. 532) 
4.0 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION AND DISCUSSION 
This section will present the empirical data collected, and also discuss the findings through 
comparing the cases with each other and the theory. This will be done consecutively throughout 
the chapter. Differences and similarities between the H1N1 influenza in Norway and the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa will be discussed initially by comparing certain qualities set out by 
Ansell et. al. (2010). Later, the story of pigs and bats will be told, with focus on crisis 
development and termination. Using t’ Hart & Boin (2001) crisis typology the timeframes of 
the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola outbreak will be highlighted. In the end, the mechanisms for 





4.1 THE TRANSBOUNDARY SCALE 
To compare cases, it is important that they possess the same qualities. This chapter will address 
these qualities between the H1N1 influenza in Norway and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. 
Levels of governance, cross-sector spread and timeframe for crisis are main qualities, as 
identified by Ansell et. al. (2010), for grading just how transboundary a crisis is. 
4.1.1 PREPAREDNESS VERSUS LACKING DELEGATION 
Ansell et. al. (2010) identifies that levels of governance, both vertically and horizontally, and 
political boundaries are the main areas of authority in a crisis.  
Levels of governance 
Health is considered the sovereign responsibility of countries, however, the means to fulfill this 
responsibility is increasingly global (WHOa, 2015, p. 5). When there is a threat to global health, 
the WHO3 is immediately involved in different degrees. The agency serves as an international 
governing authority on threats regarding global health and can give guidance on the 
international effort to combat the pandemic. These efforts are enforced through the International 
Health Regulations (DSB, 2010). Norway, for example, was obliged to cooperate with other 
governments nationally, and to report their progress to the WHO during the H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. According to Ansell et. al. (2010) the more levels of governance that is involved in 
a crisis, the more difficult it will be to manage. International and national laws usually govern 
what levels of government are involved. In Norway, the Law on health and societal 
contingencies, dictates that municipalities, county administration, regional health enterprises 
and the state are required to develop contingency plans for the medical and social services they 
are responsible for, with the health and well-being of the inhabitants as a focus (DSB, 2010 p. 
11).  
In Western Africa, national governments and some Non-Governmental Organizations, were 
involved in the Ebola outbreak response. When 1,600 people had been infected and the 
epidemic was spiraling out of control the WHO declared the Ebola outbreak to be a “Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern” (UN, 2016, p. 6). This attracted the international 
attention and also international levels of governance, which led to more resources at disposal. 
Several regional and sub-regional organizations took action to support the response to the Ebola 
outbreak when the national levels of government in the most affected countries were 
                                                                
3 As shown in Appendix 2.0 
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overwhelmed. Most prominently, the African Union Peace and Security Council authorized the 
deployment of an African Union-led Military-Civil Humanitarian Mission consisting of 
medical doctors, nurses and paramedical personnel (UN, 2016, p. 42).  
In Norway, the Law on special health care (DSB, 2010, p.11) states that regional health 
enterprises should give special health-care, and develop contingency plans for the people in 
their health regions. Also, the Law on protection against infectious diseases (DSB, 2010, p. 11) 
gives the Health Directorate a key role in deciding if, and when, municipalities, counties or 
state institutions should organize certain services or measures. The law also imposes the Public 
Health Institute to monitor the epidemiological situation, and ensure adequate vaccine supply 
and preparedness. At the top level, the leading organ in dealing with epidemics/pandemics is 
the Health Department. This is embedded through “Stortingsmelding Nummer 37” (DSB, 2010, 
p. 12).  
From this we can see that both Norway and Western Africa had all levels of government 
involved from top to bottom, or in other words: from state to municipalities and local health. 
The difference is that in the West African region there was to a much higher degree the 
involvement of international levels of governance.  
Political boundaries 
The H1N1 influenza infected almost the whole world, but every country were themselves 
responsible in managing the threat nationally. In Norway, the WHOs focal point is the Public 
Health Institute (DSB, 2010, p. 39). Norway was initially governed internationally through the 
IHR §10, which made the Public Health Institute notify the Health Department, the Health 
Directorate and hospitals on the “Declaration of the Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern” described by the WHO (WHO, 2011, pp. 54-55). After this, the WHO had minimal 
interactions with the Norwegian response to the pandemic, except from giving international 
situational reports on the H1N1 influenza, technical guidance on the pandemic, and doing 
international surveillance on the spread of the outbreak (DSB, 2010 p. 74). The WHOs 
interaction with national governance was the opposite for the three most affected countries in 
Western Africa. 
During the early days of the Ebola outbreak, there was a lack of clarity over national 
administration and who were in charge of coordinating the response, and which organizations 
should attend relevant meetings (UN, 2016, p. 37). In addition, the was a lack of clarity from 
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the WHO over the inter-agency leadership and coordination arrangements for health crises, 
which delayed a response UN, 2016, p. 8). This delay led the United Nations Secretary-General 
to take the unprecedented decision to establish the first United Nations health emergency 
mission (UN, 2016, p. 8).  
In Norway, there was a clear delegation of responsibility, from state to municipal level, as 
outlined through the framework “National Contingency Plan for Pandemic Influenza”, although 
the political boundaries were maybe not so clearly accounted for (DSB, 2010, p. 13). 
Horizontally, there was an equal responsibility for each municipality in providing health 
support to its inhabitants (DSB, 2010). The response to the H1N1 influenza was, to some extent, 
spread across horizontal boundaries. 
In line with Ansell et. al. (2010), I would argue that because of the wider spread of political 
boundaries in Western Africa, the Ebola outbreak would be more difficult to manage, although 
Norway also experienced some political spread.  In Norway there was a predetermined plan for 
delegation of responsibility, while this was not the case in the West African countries. The lack 
of clear cut delegation led to an extensive spread of political boundaries, all the way up to the 
UN, the WHO and other actors (including national and foreign Non-Governmental 
Organizations). 
4.1.2 INDICATIONS OF INTERCONNECTEDNESS 
The H1N1 influenza in Norway was mainly a concern for the health sector, although other 
sectors would have been affected depending on the development of the pandemic (DSB, 2010, 
p. 57). The other sectors involved, was so, mainly due to questions regarding persons with 
Norwegian ethnicity in foreign countries and the spread of the disease from human to swine 
(DSB, 2010, p. 57). For the three most affected countries in West Africa it was, again, the 
opposite. 
The impacts of the Ebola outbreak spanned well beyond health, economies were affected, food 
became scarce, and development stalled (WHO, 2014). Approximately 70 countries imposed 
more than 500 travel or trade restrictions on travelers or goods from affected countries (UN, 
2016, p. 66). Rice production, in Guinea, fell by 20 per cent, coffee production by 50 per cent 
and cocoa production by 33 per cent (UN, 2016, p. 26). Small businesses collapsed, markets 
closed down, and farming activities was abandoned (UN, 2016, p. 26). Fishery exports, fell by 
40 per cent, while rubber exports experienced a similar decline in Liberia (UN, 2016, p. 27).  In 
all three Ebola-affected countries, international investors postponed new projects or pulled out 
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altogether, and as airlines suspended flights and potential visitors changed their plans, hotel 
occupancy fell sharply. The Gambia, which has never had a case of Ebola, saw a 65 per cent 
decrease in tourism (UN, 2016, p. 27). Schools remained closed for more than five months, 
depriving an estimated five million children of educational opportunities (UN, 2016, p. 27). 
Some responders noted that the exclusive focus on the Ebola response led to the suspension of 
many essential social services, including vaccination (UN, 2016, p. 40). In Liberia, for example, 
routine immunizations against measles were suspended during the Ebola outbreak (UN, 2016, 
p. 40). The death-toll from other health impacts of Ebola is likely to be larger than the death-
toll from the epidemic itself (UN, 2016, p. 40).  
According to Ansell et. al. (2010) the crossing of functional borders makes a transboundary 
crisis more difficult to manage. In Norway, this was not a main concern, while it was a great 
challenge for the Ebola-affected countries. When the health of whole societies started to 
deteriorate, it had impacts on all other sectors. The effects the Ebola outbreak had on other 
sectors in Western Africa highlights gives strong indications on just how interconnected health 
is with other systems. This is not that illogical, as health and the will to survive is perhaps one 
of very few things every living being has in common. Thus, I would argue that the consequences 
of deteriorating health in Western Africa indicate that the health sector might be one of the most 
important for preserving the continuity of communities. 
4.1.3 THE CUSTODIANS OF A CRISIS 
The H1N1 influenza was formally declared as a “Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern” on the 24th of April 2009, and the WHO increased the pandemic threat level on the 
29th of April 2009 (DSB, 2010, p. 42-44). Then on the 11th of June 2009, the WHO declared a 
pandemic (DSB, 2010, p. 42-44). The 10th of August 2010, the H1N1 influenza was no longer 
in phase 6 of influenza pandemic alert, and instead were now moving into the post-pandemic 
period (WHO, 2010).  
The Ebola outbreak was formally declared as a “Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern” on the 8th of August 2014, then on 18th and 19th of September 2014 an emergency 
session of the UN Security Council was convened (UN, 2016, p. 82). It was decided to create 
the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first time in 
history the UN has created a mission for health emergency (UN, 2016, p. 82). On the 7th of 
November 2015, Sierra Leone was declared Ebola-free, and the 29th of December 2015 Guinea 
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was also declared Ebola-free (WHO, 2016). On 29th of March 2016 the Ebola was degraded 
from a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” (WHO, 2016).  
A crisis with clear cut beginning and end are easier to manage according to Ansell et. al. (2010). 
Both the crisis in Norway and West Africa are clearly defined by the WHO as to when they 
began and ended. This implies that these cases should have been easier, than a pandemic in 
which there are uncertainty about the beginning and end, to manage. The WHO as custodians 
of framing a crisis’ start and ending can result in this misinterpretation.  
4.1.4 H1N1 INFLUENZA AND EBOLA COMPARABLE? 
Through the mapping of the dimension identified in the transboundary crisis theory it should 
be possible to answer to what extent the H1N1 influenza in Norway and the Ebola outbreak is 
comparable. 
I would argue that the H1N1 influenza pandemic in Norway and the Ebola outbreak in Western 
Africa are comparable. While the Ebola outbreak surely is more transboundary on the scale, 
most of the same factors defining these kind of crisis can be found within both cases. According 
to Ansell et. al. (2010) then, the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa should be harder to manage 
than the H1N1 influenza in Norway, even though they both are a pandemic; the reasons being 
more levels of government involved and the greater spread of political and functional 
boundaries during the Ebola outbreak.  
While it was not initially the purpose of the research question, some additional findings surfaced 
in comparing Norway with the countries in Western Africa. 
First, the importance of preparedness makes it self quite clear when there were great 
uncertainties around political authority and responsibilities in the affected countries in Western 
Arica. The result of not having a predetermined plan for delegation, made the Ebola outbreak 
much worse. I am not arguing that if such a predetermined plan was in order in the affected 
countries in Western Africa the Ebola outbreak wouldn’t have happened, but at least delegation 
of responsibilities and authorities would have gone smoother. In effect, there could have been 
less initial stalling on managing the Ebola pandemic. Second, interconnectedness was shown 
through the consequences of a poor health system. Third, the WHO as custodians of a crisis is 
questioned, since it can lead to misinterpretation of the timeframe and how difficult a crisis 
should be to manage. This led me to a different view on crisis development and the revisit of 
timeframe of the pandemics. 
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4.2 PIGS AND BATS AND TIMEFRAMES 
This section will give an overview on how the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola virus originated 
and spread. The development of the crisis will be addressed and then there will be a discussion 
on crisis termination. The last part will question whether “survival of the richest” is really 
applicable when infectious diseases are concerned. 
Pigs 
The most probable source of the H1N1 influenza is from La Gloria in Veracruz in Mexico, and 
a boy named Édgar Hernández. He was identified as the first person infected with the H1N1 
influenza (Lacey, 2009). Initially, many news sources blamed the pig farms near La Gloria as 
the origin of the H1N1 virus (Carlsen, 2009; Foley, 2009; Morales, 2009; Philpott, 2009). This 
spurred an investigation of the pig farms and the health of the pigs, but the results were 
disappointing for those in the media apparatus that wanted to solely blame meat producing 
corporations. This would fit nicely into Noji (2008) and Ross et. al. (2015) description of food 
processing as a main factor for creating pandemics, but experiments on the pigs showed that 
this was not the case. There was no evidence of “influenza-like disease either among the 16,125 
swine at the pig breeding farm nearby or among the hogs owned by the locals. Also, no 
influenza-like symptoms have yet been documented among the farm workers or in the 
community” (López-Cervantes, Venado, Moreno, Pacheco-Domínguez, Ortega-Pierres, 2009, 
p. 329).  
The H1N1 influenza is a combination of classical influenza, North American avian flu and a 
strain of human flu, which all at the same time recombined inside one pig to create the new 
influenza H1N1, also labeled “swine flu” (Kaplan, 2009; Knox, 2009; Masterson, 2009). How 
this happened is still a mystery, as pigs does not have the habit of traveling internationally, and 
when they do, it is under strict quarantines (Kaplan, 2009). This has of course spurred many 
conspiracy theories on how the virus was created, the two dominant being that it was a terrorist 
attack, and the other that it was created by the American government (RationalWiki, 2016).  
While there is uncertainty around the creation of the H1N1 influenza, the most probable reason 
for the spread of the H1N1 influenza is the high rate of migration between the states of Veracruz 
and Oaxaca (López-Cervantes et. al., 2009, p. 329).  This is in line with Noji (2008) and Ross 
et. al. (2015), whom state that overpopulation and travel are main factors for the creation of 
pandemics. The H1N1 influenza pandemic is estimated to have killed 12,469 persons in the 
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USA, but its estimated death toll in Africa and Southeast Asia was 10 times higher (UN, 2016, 
p. 28).  
Bats 
The Ebola outbreak on the other hand, is a previously known infectious disease, and was 
originally identified in 1976 in Zaire and South Sudan (Fauci, 2014, p. 1084). Emile Ouamouno 
from Meliandou, Guinea, was two years old when he suffered a brief and intense fever and died 
on the 28th of December 2013 (UN, 2016). Likely transmitted through contact with an infected 
fruit bat, the virus that killed Emile spread quickly and led to the deaths of his sister Philomene, 
his pregnant mother Sia, and his grandmother Koumba (UN, 2016, p. 21). When Koumba 
sought treatment at the hospital in nearby Guéckédou, the infection spread to health workers, 
who in turn, unknowingly carried it to other villages (UN, 2016, p. 21). At the end of January 
2014, Guinean authorities dispatched a team of local health workers to Meliandou to investigate 
the mysterious deaths, but the team failed to diagnose the disease (UN, 2016, p. 21). Through 
this it is quite easy to identify factors such as land use (food source) and absent or ineffective 
health and surveillance systems as outlined by Noji (2008) and Ross et. al. (2015) as factors for 
the creation of pandemics. 
It was not until the end of March 2014 that the Ebola virus was identified and reported to the 
WHO in Geneva, by which 49 cases and 29 deaths had been registered and the disease had 
already spread to neighboring Sierra Leone (UN, 2016, p. 21). Eventually, tragic scenes started 
to play out on the streets of Monrovia, Freetown, and other rural areas, where people were dying 
at the gates of overflowing treatment centers (UN, 2016, p. 23). There was even spread of the 
virus through international air travel, confirming again Noji (2008) and Ross et. al. (2015) 
summary of factors contributing to a pandemic. An airline passenger, Patrick Sawyer, a top 
government official in Liberia, introduced the virus into Lagos, Nigeria – the first time that 
Ebola enters a new country via international air travel (UN, 2016, p. 81). On the 2nd and 5th of 
August 2014, the first American and Spanish patients with Ebola were medically evacuated to 
their home countries (UN, 2016, p. 23). The arrival of Ebola in the developed world sparked 
global media attention to the disease (UN, 2016, p. 23).  
The Ebola pandemic in West Africa was unprecedented in scale, but the infection rate and the 
transmissibility of the virus are similar to those in previous Ebola outbreaks (WHO Ebola 
Response Team, 2014, p. 1487). Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are resource-poor countries 
already coping with major health challenges, such as malaria and other endemic diseases, some 
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of which may be confused with Ebola (Fauci, 2014, p. 1085). The WHO Ebola Response (2014) 
team claim that the present epidemic is exceptionally large, but not because of the biologic 
characteristics of the virus (p. 1487). Another assessment state that it is unlikely that the 
particularly devastating course of this epidemic can be attributed to biologic characteristics of 
the virus. (Farrar & Piot, 2014, p. 1545). It is then confirmed that this particular outbreak of 
Ebola is no less virulent than earlier outbreaks, and that there needs to be other explanations for 
the course of events in the outbreak.  
The West African borders are porous, and movement between countries is constant, where 
health care is inadequate, and health workers and essential supplies are scarce (Fauci, 2014, p. 
1085). Hospitals often became centers of infection (UN, 2016, p. 22). In 1987, the International 
Monetary Fund closed its portfolio to an already deeply plagued and corrupt regime (Niang, 
2014). The collapse of state resources caused the systematic dismantling of public authorities, 
especially in rural areas (Niang, 2014). More than 30 per cent of the rural population lacks 
access to potable water, 4 out of every 5 people lack access to basic sanitation facilities, one-
third of all children under 5 suffer from stunted growth due to under-nutrition, more than 30 
per cent of children do not complete primary education, and less than half of all adults are 
literate (UN, 2016, p. 55).  
There is a misappropriate number of people infected and killed based on how developed the 
health systems in the country is. Where you live in the world, in a Western developed nation, 
or in a poorer developing country, will be a deciding factor if you live, die or spread the 
infection onwards. During the H1N1 influenza pandemic it was 10 times more likely to die if 
you were born in a poor part of the world. This unfair situation was also illustrated by Ebola, 
which were unable to spread in Western civilizations, but resulted in thousands of deaths in 
Western Africa. 
Crisis development 
Using ‘t Hart & Boin’s (2001) typology I would argue that the H1N1 influenza should not have 
been a surprise. The modern world, with international travel, deforestation, poverty, migration 
and land use forces strains of virus in closer proximities to humans. Thus, modernization of the 
world has slowly laid the grounds for pandemics to happen. I would argue that the H1N1 crisis 
was being slowly developed through the process of developing the modern world; in essence, 
the modern world actually creates the infrastructure for pandemics.  
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The Ebola outbreak is a result of much of the same processes as the H1N1 influenza pandemic, 
and neither this pandemic should have been a surprise. Emile Ouamouno, patient zero of the 
Ebola outbreak, set off a chain of events that would lead to the deaths of more than 11,000 
people, create worldwide fear, and require the mobilization of a multi-billion-dollar global 
response (UN, 2016, p. 4). In line with t’ Hart & Boin (2001), this crisis was also being 
developed slowly by the modernization of the world. Factors such as food processing, land use 
and international travel (Noji, 2008; Ross et. al., 2015) played a crucial role in creating the 
foundations for the original Ebola virus identified in 1976. What separates the Ebola outbreak 
from the H1N1 influenza is that it was not the biological characteristic of the Ebola in itself that 
caused the pandemic to be so comprehensive. The intensity was facilitated by factors such as 
poverty and absent or ineffective health and surveillance systems. This is also in line with Noji 
(2008) and Ross et. al. (2015). 
Crisis termination 
The H1N1 crisis was terminated somewhat slowly, following the natural evolution of the virus. 
As said by the Director-General of the WHO on when the pandemic was labeled as over: “The 
world is no longer in phase 6 of influenza pandemic alert. We are now moving into the post-
pandemic period. The new H1N1 virus has largely run its course” (WHO, 2010). Although the 
termination process of the virus was not yet over, as there were still cases of H1N1 influenza 
circulating: “As we enter the post-pandemic period, this does not mean that the H1N1 virus has 
gone away. Based on experience with past pandemics, we expect the H1N1 virus to take on the 
behavior of a seasonal influenza virus and continue to circulate for some years to come” (WHO, 
2010). The strategy to terminate the H1N1 influenza in Norway was highly dependent on 
vaccines, and then to “wait the pandemic out”.  
The Ebola outbreak was terminated very slowly, following measures of tracing, monitoring, 
containment and the building of capacities and capabilities to manage further cases of Ebola 
outbreak (WHO, 2016). It is noted that Western Africa now possess the world’s largest pool of 
expertise in responding to Ebola, and that vaccine creation has sharpened the ability to fight 
Ebola with containment (WHO, 2016). It is also pointed out that a high level of vigilance and 
response capacity must be maintained to ensure the ability of the countries to prevent Ebola 
infections and to rapidly detect, and respond to flare-ups in the future (WHO, 2016). 
The pace of termination in Norway followed what the population needed to fight the disease: 
immunity. Thus, vaccination was the main instrument for combating the H1N1 influenza, 
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seeing that health systems were already in order. In the Ebola outbreak however, these health 
systems had to be created first. When these were in order, it was possible to combat the Ebola 
outbreak under somewhat same terms as in Norway: with immunity generated from 
vaccination. While this is an oversimplification of what was needed in the Ebola outbreak 
response, it does show that vaccines were the final solution to the Ebola outbreak as well.  
4.2.1 SURVIVAL OF THE RICHEST? 
Through empirical investigation, comparing of the cases, as well as theoretical considerations 
in the discussion it is possible to identify what the relationship between Norway and the most 
affected countries in Western Africa has on reasons for pandemics emerging. 
Both the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola outbreaks were developed and terminated slowly. This 
makes it possible to characterize them as a slow-burning crisis (‘t Hart & Boin, 2001). It seems 
like the general perception that the WHO was taken by surprise has spurred many formal 
investigations into their management, with critique and proposal for changing the agency 
(WHOd, 2015). This also happened after the H1N1 influenza (UN, 2016). Although it is 
important to have an international governing body, that knows what it does, I would argue that 
this is to overlook the dimension of slow development, caused by factors identified by 
researchers such as Noji (2008) and Ross et. al. (2015). No matter how much the WHO is 
changed to better be able to manage pandemics, the foundations for a pandemic will always be 
there. Looking forward it is even more somber, as the factors that slowly have created 
pandemics are only increasing. The focus on the WHOs wrongdoings can hide other important 
aspects of a pandemic. 
Thus, if one defines the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola outbreak as a long-shadow crisis, which 
develops quickly and is terminated gradually (t’ Hart & Boin, 2001), the focus on wrongdoings 
could be pushed towards the states and the WHOs strategic, operative and tactical management 
of the crisis. By adopting the second view, of a crisis that is slow-burning, factors such as food 
processing, land use, international travel, poverty and absent or ineffective health and 
surveillance systems are easier to identify as reasons for the pandemic. The best view would 
probably be to combine both perspectives and say that there are reasons for the slow 
development of a pandemic (e.g. land use, international travel, poverty), while lacks in 
management can lead to disease propagation. 
I would argue that the relationship between Norway and the most affected countries in Western 
Africa is that factors such as international travel, deforestation, migration and land use create 
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breeding grounds that, non-discriminately, can affect both developed and developing nations. 
The difference is that factors such as poverty and absent or ineffective health and surveillance 
systems, will play a crucial role in facilitating how the pandemic will unfold. A poor health 
system will eventually lead to the spread of an infection. Either way, every nation is likely to 
be affected as long as there are poor health systems where pandemics originate from. It also 
implies that the management of a pandemic, in many ways, is actually the management of an 
epidemic in the source countries. Both the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola virus had to be 
terminated through immunization, but in Western Africa health systems had to be created first.  
4.3 CORE CHALLENGES 
A great deal of challenges can emerge during crisis, and this section will discuss many of them. 
Ansell et. al. (2010) categorize four core components of challenges that emerge during any 
crisis: uncertainty, surge capacity, organizing a response and communicating with the public. 
These challenges and how they are propagating disease will be summarized in the last part. 
4.3.1 DELIBERATE UNCERTAINTY-MAKING 
Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort (2001) tells that uncertainty is a defining characteristic of any crisis. 
Ansell et. al. (2010) divides uncertainty in three main components: source of the crisis, 
evolution of the crisis and possible solutions. 
Source 
There was not much uncertainty about the source of the H1N1 influenza in Norway, because 
there were early warnings on the emergence of a new strain of virus that could lead to a 
pandemic. Mexican authorities discovered outbreaks of respiratory illness in an increasing 
pattern in patients (CDC, 2009). On April 12th, the General Directorate of Epidemiology in 
Mexico reported an outbreak of influenza-like illness in a small community in the state of 
Veracruz, this was reported further to the Pan-American Health Organization, and then it was 
picked up globally (CDC, 2009). 
Uncertainty during the Ebola outbreak was greater. A lack of reliable data led the WHO and 
others to underestimate the scale of the outbreak (UN, 2016, p. 46). The WHO did not 
adequately take into account the fact that significant numbers of initial cases of Ebola went 
unreported and that early response efforts were highly insufficient. Responders incorrectly 
assumed that the outbreak would “burn itself out” within a few weeks (UN, 2016, p. 46). One 
humanitarian agency leader said, “We didn’t really pay attention to the Ebola outbreak at first, 
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because to us the numbers were so small” (WHOd, 2015, p. 23). When recognized, the scale of 
the outbreak was underestimated by experts and minimized by authorities, despite numerous 
warnings from groups (including Médecins Sans Frontières) (UN, 2016, p. 6).  
If uncertainty caused by weak health systems was not enough, the governments in the Ebola-
stricken countries also undermined the threat, and it might even seem like the governments tried 
to create uncertainty. The most probable reason for this was in order to postpone the 
“Declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern”, and in some kind of 
backwards way, this did in fact postpone the label of a crisis by the WHO. In the affected 
countries, national and local authorities initially played down reports of an Ebola outbreak for 
political reasons (UN, 2016, p. 22). In addition, while Non-Governmental Organizations and 
first responders were allowed to do their work, they were not always given the support they 
needed (UN, 2016, p. 22). Some Non-Governmental Organizations representatives even 
reported that government officials had called them alarmist in the early months of the Ebola 
outbreak (UN, 2016, p. 37). The governments of the three most affected countries and the WHO 
maintained that the outbreak would soon be under control (UN, 2016, p. 6). In some instances, 
there was initial denial of both cases and the extent of the outbreak on the part of national 
authorities (WHOd, 2015, p. 13). This is what I would like to call “deliberate uncertainty-
making” in an effort to postpone the crisis. 
Evolution 
During the H1N1 influenza, the WHO did draw attention to the uncertainty of how the 
pandemic could evolve, primarily illustrating the possibility that the virus could change its 
properties, and thus lead to a more serious threat (DSB, 2010, p. 77). Also, the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control highlighted that there was uncertainty around how the virus 
would affect particularly vulnerable groups of people (DSB, 2010, p. 77). The WHO also 
compiled frequent situation updates, which gave an overview of the global effort to combat the 
H1N1 pandemic and overviews of the spread of the infection (DSB, 2010, p. 74). 
The evolution of the Ebola crisis was more unclear. Some even feared that the virus could 
become endemic – meaning that it would become “normal” with Ebola infection and outbreak 
in these countries. Projections suggested that unless control measures improved quickly, the 
three most affected countries would be reporting thousands of cases and deaths each week 
(WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014, p. 1494). The uncertainty was heightened because of the 
lack of surveillance systems to monitor the Ebola virus, with estimates passing millions of 
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deaths. A study by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention predicted there would 
be more than 1.4 million Ebola cases in the three affected countries by January 2015 (UN, 2016, 
p. 49). There was also concerns about the total disintegration of the health care systems in the 
affected countries, with clinics closing, becoming overwhelmed or nonfunctional. There was a 
very real danger of a “complete breakdown in civic society”, as the population continues to lose 
faith in the systems that are meant to take care of them (Farrar & Piot, 2014, p. 1545). 
Solution 
As proposed by the Norwegian “National Contingency Plan for Pandemic Influenza”, vaccines 
were the main strategy to solve the H1N1 pandemic (DSB, 2010, p. 71). This response is in line 
with the strategies that were adopted by other European countries (DSB, 2010, p. 72). To 
dimension the efforts made to manage the pandemic, the Public Health Institute reassessed the 
probability of the worst case scenario proposals, and concluded that a new plan for action was 
needed, although vaccines were still to be the main strategy (DSB, 2010, p. 14). 
In Western Africa there was some uncertainty about solutions to the crisis, but mostly there was 
the realization that maybe previous solutions would not work. In an interview with the leader 
of the Ebola response he commented: “…the stark realization that the classic Ebola strategy 
was not going to work kept me awake at night” (WHOa, 2015). It is also noted that it is unlikely 
that any miracle cure, such as a vaccine, would end the pandemic. When the Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa gained international attention, significant funding was made available to research 
institutions to accelerate work on a vaccine (UN, 2016, p. 59). The WHO assisted in fast-
tracking vaccine development and provided leadership in the trials for candidate vaccines and 
in the use of experimental therapies, these were important contributions to solving the crisis 
(WHOd, 2015, p. 21). 
Summed up, in Norway there were a reassessment of the initial plans to solve the pandemic, 
where they scaled the response down – vaccines still being the main strategy. During the Ebola 
crisis it was quite clear that maintaining the response would prove crucial for solving the crisis, 
where maintaining was connected to great uncertainty. Not until the Ebola outbreak was given 
international attention was it possible to fast-track possible solutions, through developing 




4.3.2 PROVIDING SURGE CAPACITY 
In any crisis there are challenges in mobilizing people, money and goods (Ansell et. al., 2010). 
This was also the case for both the H1N1 influenza in Norway and the Ebola outbreak in 
Western Africa. 
People 
It is pointed out that lack of competent personnel would have limited the capacity to respond to 
the H1N1 influenza in Norway (DSB, 2010, p. 16). The report by the DSB (2010) point out that 
in case of a serious pandemic, the health services in some areas could cease to function. The 
mild severity of the H1N1 influenza made this only a hypothetical issue; there was no such 
surge in workforce needed. Through conversations with the health personnel, they confirmed 
that there was a lack of thorough training, and that such competence would be a bottleneck in 
an eventual new pandemic (DSB, 2010, p. 173). Further, the report does mention that if they in 
fact would have needed extra personnel, there could have been a challenge because it is not 
clear who has the authority to govern a surge workforce. In addition, different health services 
and the municipal health services have based their surge in capacity frameworks on the same 
available workforce (DSB, 2010, p. 19). 
The three most affected countries in Western Africa during the Ebola outbreak suffered from 
crucial shortages in health workers and other qualified response workers (UN, 2016, p. 35). In 
addition, many health workers became ill and died from the virus. The low number of health 
workers already lacking in these countries was a big problem. Guinea had 1 doctor pr. 10 000 
inhabitant, Liberia had 0,2, and in Sierra Leone there was only 0,1 doctor pr. 10 000 inhabitant 
(UN, 2016, p. 36). Most of these doctors were concentrated in capitals and cities, leaving 
smaller communities and rural areas without adequate access to health services (UN, 2016, p. 
36). The minimum standard recommended by the WHO is 23 doctors, nurses and midwives pr. 
10 000 inhabitants (UN, 2016). As identified by Barbisch & Koenig (2006) challenges would 
be getting in-hospital, and out-of-hospital care. In Norway, there was already in place an 
existing structure of local health personnel, for example doctors. This was not the case in the 
Ebola outbreak, as an extensive infrastructure of health personnel was lacking. 
Another major challenge during the Ebola outbreak was the lack of qualified health workers, 
several first-line responders noted this (UN, 2016, p. 48). Also, relevant expertise and 
knowledge about how an Ebola outbreak of this scale could be effectively contained was 
lacking - the pool of people with expertise in Ebola outbreaks was limited (UN, 2016, p. 48). 
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The training of surge staff was done so at record speed, but it cost valuable time (UN, 2016, p. 
35). It was also reported that deployments were too short, causing knowledge transfer to falter, 
and breakdown of professional relationships (WHOd, 2015, p. 20). Some non-medical staff was 
reluctant to work in Ebola-affected countries, as absence of guaranteed medical evacuation was 
a key disincentive for staff to join the response effort in the affected countries (UN, 2016, p. 
48).  
Money 
The Norwegian Health Department gave early signals on that the Health Directorate should 
spend around 30-50 million NOK on the purchase of drugs. It was also ordered that the regional 
health enterprises should obtain drugs and equipment for an equal sum of money. Most of this 
money went to antivirals, antibiotics, as well as some syringes and needles (DSB, 2010, p. 171). 
There is no overview of the Norwegian municipalities expenses, but there were not given any 
additional funding from state level to manage the pandemic (DSB, 2010, p. 50). The expenses 
were mainly linked to the vaccination of the general public, which the population payed for 
themselves (DSB, 2010). 
In West Africa, there were some problems regarding the funding of the crisis response. Niang 
(2014) point out that, for example, Sierra Leone is an immensely rich country in raw materials, 
but with one of the poorest populations in the world. The reasons for poverty can be attributed 
to poor government. The WHO rely on voluntary funding as there are no immediately available 
standing resources (UN, 2016, p. 17). There are no core funds for emergency response (WHOd, 
2015, p. 6). Dr. Bruce Aylward, who led the response to the Ebola pandemic, commented: “We 
have the strategy, we have the infrastructure in place, we have the commitment of the people. 
The question now is: will we have the resources to finish the job?” (WHOa, 2015). 
Strikes by hospital staff and burial teams further decreased number of people available. Staff 
were not paid for weeks or months and did not receive promised hazard pay (WHOc, 2015). 
Comparing Norway and the most affected West African countries then, there was quite early 
signals on mobilizing money in Norway, for example to vaccines. The problem with the Ebola 
outbreak in Western Africa was the already poor nations and that the WHO relies on voluntary 
contributions in fighting diseases. This made development of vaccines, and the procurement of 




The distribution of the H1N1 influenza vaccine in Norway was challenging. The Public Health 
Institute stipulated a fixed price for anyone that wanted to take on the assignment of vaccine 
distribution, but only got two offers, of which only one company satisfied the criteria. The 
company normally did distribution of fish vaccines (DSB, 2010, p. 96). There were great 
uncertainties on what time the deliveries were supposed to be done. Some of this blame stems 
from delays in the deliverances to Norway, while some blame is on the transporters for not 
informing the municipalities on arrival times, or changes thereof (DSB, 2010, p. 96). The other 
goods that were bought were perceived as being satisfied mobilized, according to a national 
survey (DSB, 2010, p. 171). 
Equipment needed in the Ebola response on the other hand, such as cars, motorcycles, tents and 
beds were not always easy to procure, neither were equipment needed to protect health workers, 
e.g. suits, plastic buckets, disinfectant and gloves (UN, 2016, p. 48). Furthermore, unilateral 
border closures, and trade and travel restrictions, hindered the flow of response supplies to the 
affected countries (UN, 2016, p. 48). Many commercial flights suspended their flights to the 
Ebola-stricken countries, resulting in the use of special humanitarian logistics networks, while 
the absence of viable roads also led to the reliance on helicopters in some areas (UN, 2016, p. 
48). Also, in for example Liberia, there were a limited number of ambulances, most of which 
were located in the capital Monrovia (UN, 2016, p. 37). This led to the use of taxies, or that 
family members had to carry the sick – effectively leading to an increase in infection. The lack 
of laboratories and isolation facilities meant that the sick and the healthy often were co-located 
in holding centers, which further increased disease transmission (UN, 2016, p. 37). Barbisch & 
Koenig (2006) recognizes that other functional areas will need to be in place for the health 
system to work optimally, such as personnel, logistics and transport – highly in in line with the 
missing infrastructures in the West African countries. In rural areas, the medication was hard 
to come by and often too costly (UN, 2016, p. 37) 
For Norway, mobilization of the vaccine was the greatest challenge, mainly linked to the 
lacking quality and size of distributors. In Western Africa this was also a challenge, but there 
was also the challenge of mobilizing much needed medical and basic survival equipment. Poor 
general infrastructure was also a great challenge, resulting in helicopters sometimes being the 
only mode of transportation.  
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4.3.3 INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATION AND MESSY FRAMEWORKS 
Many challenges in organizing a crisis response stems from the need to cooperate with other 
regions (Ansell et. al., 2010). Also, coordination within the response actor can be challenging. 
When a crisis crosses into a new sector, or functional area, even more challenges can emerge.  
Cooperation with other regions 
In Norway there seems to have been little cooperation between municipalities regarding 
vaccination (DSB, 2010, p. 156). 
In the West African countries, the greatest challenge with coordinating with other regions (and 
in this case other countries) was to get them to start cooperating. There are clear disincentives 
for countries to report outbreaks quickly and transparently (WHOd, 2015, p. 11). The 
“Declaration of the Public Health Emergency of International Concern” is associated with 
stigma, and the declaration can be politically influenced whether to impose or not (WHOd, 
2015, p. 10). The countries affected faced not only severe political, economic and social 
consequences but also barriers to receiving necessary personnel and supplies (WHOd, 2015, p. 
11). Because of the anticipated stigma associated with a “Declaration of the Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern” there was no coordination between the West African 
countries until it was absolutely needed. To start cooperating with each other they would also 
have to accept the declaration, and in consequence the associated stigma. Early in the Ebola 
outbreak, cross border information sharing was inadequate (UN, 2016, p. 42-43). 
One of the most crucial differences between cooperation between regions within Norway and 
the affected countries in West Africa is linked to sovereignty. The most affected West African 
countries are competing in the international markets. Import and exports of goods are important 
for accumulating wealth in the already economically pressured countries. It is not unusual that, 
for example, municipalities in Norway are cooperating in exterminating an external threat. It is 
important to remember that the municipalities in Norway are all connected through something 
overarching, namely the state level. They are also unable to impose negative economic 
measures on each other, through for example travel restrictions. This is not the case for the 
affected countries in Western Africa. These nations compete with each other, and the rest of the 
world. There are no governing bodies above state level, except maybe the UN, although in 
practice they cannot affect nations in the same way the state of Norway can affect its 
municipalities.  
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Given the power that the international community has to affect competition between states, I 
think it is important to understand that threats to trade and travel restrictions will have negative 
impacts on early inter-nation cooperation. Surely, it would seem logical for different nations to 
want to cooperate, but not if they are forced to see a large decline in their economy because of 
it. 
Upwards-downwards coordination 
The Norwegian Health Department appeared somewhat unclear in their role as the top level of 
national response actor. This was, in part because the department was too careful with 
expressing their expectations to other departments, and because the overarching coordination 
of the health sector was delegated to the Health Directorate (DSB, 2010, p. 13). Another 
important issue is how far the Public Health Institutes role as administrative body regarding the 
vaccines reaches, and how far the Health Directorate authority reaches in performing 
overarching coordination (DSB, 2010, p. 13). If the pandemic had been more severe, these 
issues could have led to challenges in for example the distribution of vaccines or who should 
be prioritized, as both the Health Directorate and the Public Health Institute administrative 
powers downwards in the response. The DSB report (2010) emphasizes that the national 
political boundaries should have had a higher grade of formalization to avoid potential conflicts 
of role and to ensure quality in decisions (DSB, 2010, p. 13). While it is the municipalities in 
Norway that has the overall responsibility in combating infectious disease, this responsibility 
is in practice transferred the chief municipal doctor. This can be challenging because many of 
the smaller municipalities only have this kind of doctor part-time, or not at all (DSB, 2010, p. 
156).  
The county governors and the municipalities told that reporting regime was too extensive, 
although they did understand the necessity of this reporting (DSB, 2010, p. 17). The total 
information volume was too big, and the same information could often come from different 
channels, or from multiple senders. Information from the different authorities was not 
adequately coordinated (DSB, 2010, p. 17). Half of the municipalities reported that there was a 
good balance between central management and local freedom, while a little above one third 
reported that there should have been a stronger central management (DSB, 2010, p. 162). 
For the most affected countries in Western Africa, there was initially a lack of clarity over which 
entities within a national administration were in charge of coordinating the response, and which 
organizations should attend relevant meetings (UN, 2016, p. 37). In some cases, decision-
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making was even slowed by inter-departmental rivalries and unclear reporting lines between 
the Ministry of Health, the National Ebola Coordinator and structures created by international 
partners (UN, 2016, p. 37). In some instances, existing national disaster response structures 
were not used and new structures were designed instead; it took several months for coordination 
structures at the capital level to be replicated nationwide (UN, 2016, p. 37).  
The WHO should have played a key role in this coordination, but it took a long time to get 
started (WHOd, 2015, p. 19). In the early stages of the Ebola crisis, messages were sent by 
experienced staff about the seriousness of the crisis. Either these did not reach senior leaders or 
senior leaders did not recognize their significance (WHOd, 2015, p. 12). The WHOs 
longstanding culture is that of a technical organization setting international standards and assist 
in their implementation, and does not have a culture of emergency response (UN, 2016, p. 46-
47). Even during the Ebola outbreak, the WHOs work often focused on monitoring 
epidemiological data and on advising ministries of health. The WHOs complex governance 
structure creates confusion as to which unit leads the emergency response (UN, 2016, p. 47). 
The WHO does not have an organizational culture that supports open and critical dialogue 
between senior leaders and staff, or a culture that permits risk-taking or critical approaches to 
decision-making (WHOd, 2015, p. 12). The WHOs response capacity in large-scale 
emergencies, shows that the biggest skill gap continues to be found in the area of crisis 
coordination and leadership (WHOd, 2015, p. 17). The Ebola emergency exposed the WHOs 
inadequate operational capacity, even when the organization recognized the escalating response 
needs, its internal administrative rules on human resources, procurement and finance did not 
facilitate the rapid deployments of staff or emergency response materials (UN, 2016, p. 48).  
The WHO should have engaged the support of the United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs and other UN agencies and humanitarian actors through the United 
Nations’ Inter-Agency Standing Committee early in the outbreak (WHOd, 2015, p. 24). In 
addition, the lack of clarity from the WHO over the inter-agency leadership and coordination 
arrangements for health crises delayed an effective response. This delay led the UN Secretary-
General to establish the first United Nations health emergency mission. This mission catalyzed 
high-level political and financial support (WHOd, 2015, p. 8). The mission functioned by 
bypassing existing mechanisms, rather than by engaging the United Nations cluster system 
(WHOd, 2015, p. 24). A number of stakeholders at country level also reported that the mission 
was unwieldy, and said that it took two critical months to establish itself at the height of the 
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epidemic when parts of the existing cluster system could have been used instead (WHOd, 2015, 
p. 24).  
In both the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola outbreak it was unclear who had the topmost 
authority. In Norway this situation lasted throughout the crisis, while in Western Africa this 
was sorted out after some time. The factors identified through the WHOs management can 
mainly be summarized like this: lacking dialogue between top leaders and staff, no culture for 
risk taking in decision-making, unsuitable internal administrative rules on human resources and 
slow and lacking understanding of inter-agency leadership and coordination arrangements for 
health crises. Most of these factors are attributed to the WHO being mainly a technical agency, 
and not a crisis responder. It surely is important to change the WHO into an agency capable of 
managing international health threats, but they are highly bureaucratic in nature. Thus, the 
agency may be reluctant to change itself, even when there are imposed orders from above. The 
factors for disease propagation that can be attributed to the WHO were also identified during 
the H1N1 influenza, and still the Ebola outbreak were able to claim the lives of over 10 000 
people (UN, 2016). 
Cooperating with other sectors 
The pandemic in Norway was to a large extent managed within the health sector, but the county 
managers did express that there was good cooperation between the branch on contingency and 
the health departments (DSB, 2010, p. 138). The reason the Norwegian contingency sector and 
health sector were able to cooperate, can be explained by that the contingency sector probably 
had prior knowledge on how the health sector operates. Seeing as contingency penetrates the 
whole of society it is not unlikely that this sector had some previous knowledge of logics and 
operating imperatives within the health sector. This is corroborated by Ansell et. al. (2010) who 
states that information is most likely to flow between jurisdictions and organizations that have 
prior knowledge of each other. 
During the Ebola outbreak on the other hand, cooperation between sectors was a key challenge. 
The health sector and humanitarian sector respond differently to a crisis, but the Ebola outbreak 
was large and complex, which required a combined health and humanitarian response (WHOd, 
2015, p. 15). It is unclear how a public health emergency fits into the wider humanitarian 
system, and at what point an infectious outbreak becomes a humanitarian emergency that 
requires a broader UN response (WHOd, 2015, p. 23). Many donors, governments, the UN, the 
WHO and Non-Governmental Organizations understand only one or the other system (WHOd, 
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2015, p. 23).  In part this was due to lack of understanding different approaches to risk 
assessment. In addition, the emergency grading levels do not coordinate well across the WHOs 
Emergency Response Framework, the UNs humanitarian system and the International Health 
Regulations (WHOd, 2015, p. 7). The WHO’s “Pandemic Phases” distinguish disease outbreaks 
in six phases. The WHOs “Emergency Response Framework” recognizes three grades of health 
emergencies and describes the WHOs responsibilities in each case. Also, the WHO is able to 
declare a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” through the International Health 
Regulations (UN, 2016, p. 53). In the broader humanitarian system, the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committees “Framework for Classifying Humanitarian Emergencies” also consists of three 
levels, each with a different response mobilization implication (UN, 2016, p. 53). A lack of 
awareness of the four systems, combined with confusing terminology, contributed to 
misunderstandings between the health and humanitarian sectors in the early stages of the Ebola 
response. 
It was also observed that strengthening health systems will be insufficient without support for 
complementary development programs that focus on water, sanitation, electricity, basic health 
care and other related needs (UN, 2016, p. 15). As the crisis unfolded, it became clear that it 
included several other dimensions besides health – such as water sanitation, hygiene, education 
and food security (UN, 2016, p. 51). 
Two of the countries in Western Africa called upon their militaries to support health and 
humanitarian personnel. In Sierra Leone, the armed forces helped lead the health crisis response 
after the Minister of Defense was appointed as the National Ebola Response Coordinator (UN, 
2016, p. 39-40). In the absence of adequate training in human rights, the use of militarized 
responses during the Ebola crisis did not always build confidence. Particularly challenging was 
quarantines, clashes between the Liberian military and civilians in the West Point area of 
Monrovia even led to one death (UN, 2016, p. 40).  
As mentioned by Ansell et. al. (2010), management challenges can emerge when different 
sectors have to cooperate with each other, often because different sectors  “involve systems with 
different logics and operating imperatives” (Ansell et. al., 2010, p. 196). This is easily identified 
during the Ebola outbreak, especially on how there was misunderstanding around the different 
logics and operating imperatives between the WHOs “Pandemic Phases”, the WHOs 
“Emergency Response Framework”, the WHOs “Declaration of Public Health Emergency of 
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International Concern” and the Inter-Agency Standing Committees “Framework for 
Classifying Humanitarian Emergencies”. 
4.3.4 BLOOD HARVEST AND “THE PEOPLE OF THE FOREST” 
This chapter will focus on the challenges that comes from communicating with the public, as 
there is a need to convey rumors, reports and situational pictures into correct information 
(Ansell et. al., 2010). The challenges will be divided into the main principles identified by the 
WHO (2008) for communicating infectious diseases. 
Trust 
In Norway, there was not really a problem of having to establish trust between the manager of 
the crisis and the population, as Norwegians are regarded as already having a high degree of 
trust. Trust is, as identified by the WHO (2008), crucial in communicating diseases. In West 
Africa, trust towards the governments was not already a fact. In the early days of the Ebola 
outbreak some people thought that Ebola had been brought into the country by political forces 
as a tool for domination or to make money (WHOb, 2015, p. 72). One nurse even proclaimed 
that Ebola was about blood trafficking, that governments needed blood for sale in Western 
countries, and that all of those affected by Ebola was actually killed for this (Niang, 2014). She 
attracted a mob, resulting in a boy who got shot because parts of this mob started heading 
towards an Ebola treatment center to burn it down (Niang, 2014).  
An issue regarding wildlife meat came to play an important role. The “bushmeat”, was 
understood by the natives as the cause of the disease (Niang, 2014). This sows disconnect for 
many, as the people and their ancestors had been living in the same ecological environment for 
centuries, hunting the same wild animals in the same forest areas, and had never before seen a 
disease like Ebola (WHOc, 2015). The communication of “bushmeat” (e. g. fruit bat) as a source 
of infection was understood as an encouragement to keep away from the forest. From the 
perspective of local communities though, the forest is an individual and collective refugee; it 
protects, reconstructs, recycles, and most important: it treats and heals social and physical harm 
(Niang, 2014). The forest had been many peoples’ protector during the dreadful civil wars, 
which resulted in countless mutilations, between 100 000 and 200 000 deaths, more than 2 
million internally displaced persons, numerous rapes, cases of sexual slavery, kidnappings, and 
the mass use of child soldiers (Niang, 2014). Decades of conflict have left the populations 
distrustful of governing officials and authority figures, including health professionals (Fauci, 
2014, p. 1085). Zones of intense transmission were kept in the shadows, communities often 
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refused to accept investigations by foreign medical staff (WHOc, 2015). Because many 
communities were in a post-conflict situation, they had high levels of distrust in authority 
(WHOd, 2015, p. 20). Early messaging about Ebola portrayed the disease as a death-sentence, 
leading suspected patients to go into hiding rather than undergo testing (UN, 2016, p. 23). Many 
stories circulated about community members who took refuge in nearby forests to escape health 
workers, whom were coming for the infected. This birthed the expression of “the people of the 
forest” to describe community resistance against a cold biomedical power, that was coming for 
the populations blood and organs (Niang, 2014). This problem was reinforced by the delayed 
“Declaration of the Public Health Emergency of International Concern”, misleading Twitter 
messages, and leaked documents (WHOd, 2015, p. 21). The WHO failed to engage proactively 
with high-level media and was unable to gain command over the narrative of the outbreak 
(WHOd, 2015, p. 21).  
While it is the WHO themselves who have developed the framework for how to communicate 
with the public in health emergencies, it seems like they did not follow it in their own 
management of the Ebola outbreak. Or more likely, they tried to follow it but were unable to, 
because of the high degree of distrust from the population. The WHO is used to having to 
establish trust in health emergencies, but I would argue that it came as a surprise that the 
population actively tried to undermine trust from authorities, because of previous experiences 
related to the civil war. This made all the other steps in the framework suffer, and all other 
communication and measures to be questioned and doubted. I would argue that a greater 
knowledge of societal conditions in countries prone to communication from international actors 
are needed, or else there is the risk of dealing with a distrustful population.  
Early warning  
The WHO was early to announce what the Ebola virus meant, but sadly it was perceived as a 
death sentence for the persons infected. People often did not want to have check-ups and many 
went into hiding. Instead of encouraging the infected to come forward, messaging drove many 
suspected cases to avoid testing, and led families to hide their sick (UN, 2016, p. 38). People 
perceived Ebola treatment units as meaning certain death – the health system was seen as 
propagating the disease (WHOb, 2015, p. 72). The framework for disease communication, 
created by the WHO, maintains that if those affected are alerted correctly it can minimize the 
rate of disease infection (WHO, 2008). What I would argue is a key word here is “correctly”. 
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By no means were the population alerted correctly if communication of the disease in fact led 
to the propagation of the virus, and not disease minimization.  
In Norway there were also some comments and discontent on the communication being a bit 
too exaggerated. Surveys show that the population to a high degree was pleased with the 
information from the government, although a majority felt that the threat of the pandemic was 
exaggerated (DSB, 2010, p. 16). One press conference on the H1N1 pandemic stands as an 
example of how exaggerated the dangers of the pandemic were. During this press conference, 
the seriousness of the situation was underlined by both the Minister and Director of Health. The 
presentation showed the worst case scenario of the pandemic, predicting 13 000 deaths and 
showing pictures of health personnel in hazmat suits, face masks and a casket (DSB, 2010, p. 
129). This image was the most used in the media during, and after, the pandemic, even though 
it was pointed out that this was not the most likely scenario. 
Central professionals that advised the WHO and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
pointed out that one should not hesitate in scaring the population if this is necessary to achieve 
wanted reactions (DSB, 2010, p. 189). I strongly disagree with this, as the Ebola outbreak is a 
shining example of what can happen if the population is scared and even tried coerced into 
certain reactions. At best, I would say that the “scaring” part has to be done so with a full 
overview of potential negative impacts it can have on the population. In any way, it reduces 
people to being seen as needing a shepherd, when they are in fact fully able to make their own 
assessment of the dangers regarding infections, if they are informed correctly. This is also one 
of the main points behind the framework for disease communication that the WHO developed 
(WHO, 2008). 
Transparency 
Furthermore, the WHO proposes transparency as a main pillar of disease communication 
(WHO, 2008). When he population goes as far as believing that the WHO have arrived in the 
country to harvest their blood and organs, it should set off some alarms within the WHO. 
Treatment centers being attacked was not uncommon, but sometimes those trying to explain to 
the community how to avoid infection also experienced violence (WHOb, 2015, p. 72). In some 
incidents, response teams were forced to hide in the bushes, fearing for their lives (WHOc, 
2015). Some riots followed disinfection campaigns, as communities believed that the spraying 
of chlorine was actually spreading Ebola (WHOc, 2015). One of the worst incident of violence 
was when an 8-member team of outbreak responders was found murdered in a village (WHOc, 
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2015). A second severe incident followed, when Red Cross volunteers who had safely buried a 
body in the town of Forecariah were attacked by an armed mob, and the angry crowd uncovered 
the fresh grave. The highly infectious corpse was removed from its body bag, and hid 
somewhere in the village (WHOc, 2015). It is emphasized that the interpretation of surges in 
violence is a call for more transparency into medical procedures (Niang, 2014).  
It is not very uncommon that humans create meaning to things that they do not understand, and 
even more so when the things that are happening are perceived as evil. Disease have always 
been with us humans; thus it is not illogical to think that there have also been ways to explain 
them. This implies that every human community, spanning from small societies to large tribes 
and even regional or national cultures, can have their own explanation for disease origin and 
propagation. By not taking control of communication, the WHO in reality created a breeding 
ground for different interpretations of disease origin and propagation; anybody were able to 
make up their own reasons, and spread them to anyone willing to listen. The Ebola outbreak 
did, for example, birth numerous mythical explanations for the pandemic, many of which 
centered around unclean women (Niang, 2014). 
In Norway, transparency was given to a great extent. The most central and important sources 
of information from the government was the internet sites “pandemi.no” and “fhi.no”, where 
90 000 visited “pandemi.no” during the initial days of its launch (DSB, 2010, p. 126). The plan 
was that all information regarding the pandemic was to be published on “pandemi.no”, but it 
instead worked as a portal that linked to other net sites. The Health Directorate channeled most 
of the information through “pandemi.no”. although the net site contained to a very little degree 
information about other eventual consequences from the pandemic, only the health aspect was 
in focus (DSB, 2010, p. 126). There were produced a lot of information throughout the 
pandemic period, the central government developed downloadable schematics that the 
municipalities could use to communicate with both the population and the media (DSB, 2010, 
p 125). The government also developed posters, adverts in local papers, vaccination advices on 
the municipalities’ net sites, invitation letters to risk groups, invitation letters to health 
personnel and schematics for vaccine cards (DSB, 2010, p. 125). 
Not only in Western Africa was there produced alternative interpretations to disease origin and 
propagation. There are cases of people who believe Norwegian government only had malicious 
intentions in different ways regarding the H1N1 influenza. Maybe this can be attributed to a 
failure in perceived transparency, not necessarily the Norwegian governments fault, but 
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somehow connected to not being able to acquire the correct information about what really 
happened during the H1N1 influenza pandemic. This can also be seen from the news sources 
that focused on assigning blame during the early period of the H1N1 influenza. They did not 
yet have complete transparency on what had really happened, which might have led to the 
production on alternative explanations (Carlsen, 2009; Foley, 2009; Morales, 2009; Philpott, 
2009). All of which blame some kind of a wicked authority.  
Listening 
In Norway, journalists had the chance to express concerns during press conferences, and get 
instant feedback. These press briefings were also held to lessen the pressure from the media, 13 
in total, where personnel from the Health Directorate and the Public Health Institute were 
present (DSB, 2010, p. 125). What really could be seen as effective listening to the public is 
from the use of social media. The use of social media was also regarded by the public as good, 
where they were able to get answer on questions regarding pandemics and vaccines (DSB, 2010, 
p. 126). This is in line with WHO (2008) on understanding the public’s risk perceptions, views 
and concerns as a tool for effective communication and the broader emergency management 
function it supports.  
During the Ebola outbreak however, no such listening occurred, at least not during the 
(precious) timeframe of the initial months. An attempt was made to burn a treatment center in 
Kenema, because no one had consulted the locals before installing an Ebola treatment center 
(or “Center of Death”) right next to a maternity ward (or “Center of Life) (Niang, 2014). The 
close proximity between corrupting Death and nourishing Life infuriated the population. 
Traditional cultural practices, including funeral and burial customs, contributed to virus 
transmission, yet culturally sensitive messages and community engagement were not prioritized 
(WHOd, 2015, p. 20). The important concept of empathy with the sick, expressed through 
touching, washing and rubbing the body of the deceased led to many infections early in the 
pandemic (WHOb, 2015, p. 73). People were fed up with being told about hand sanitization, 
they knew how Ebola is transmitted but wanted to express themselves, be heard and take charge 
of their health matters (WHOb, 2015, p. 72). During the randomized-controlled trial of 
vaccines, affected population started posing ethical questions: If treatment is available, why is 
not everyone getting it? Is the need for data more important a human life? For the communities, 




The communication strategy in Norway is based on the “National Pandemic Plan”, with clear 
cut goals and target groups (DSB, 2010, p. 16). The WHO (2008) adheres that public 
communication during an outbreak represents an enormous challenge for any public health 
authority, and therefore demands sound planning in advance. While this seems to have worked 
during the H1N1 influenza, it did not work during the Ebola outbreak, even though it was 
planned in advance.  
One of the main reasons for this, I would argue, is that the Norwegian authority knows how the 
population will react – at least to a greater degree than the WHO knew how populations in 
Western Africa would react. The framework for disease communication is an overarching 
document, but it is important to understand that perception of messages sent are subjective and 
contextual, based upon the population that is experiencing the disease. It implies that there is 
no simple formula for good communication, as messages has to be constructed in such a way 
that fits with the diseased populations world view. The difficulty of effectively engaging 
communities was a problem that could have been foreseen had a social and political analysis 
been conducted to complement the epidemiological assessments (WHOd, 2015, p. 20). 
Although the framework probably will work in most cases, I would argue that it is important to 
understand, and plan for, differences in culture and degree of trust. This will, as highlighted by 
the Ebola outbreak, be a key measure to combating a pandemic. 
4.3.5 MANY MECHANISMS FOR DISEASE PROPAGATION 
Through a mapping and discussion of the core challenges that the governments of Norway and 
the affected countries in Western Africa and the WHO faced, it is possible to identify the main 
challenges that made disease propagation possible. Following the summary on core challenges 
set out by Ansell et. al. (2010), the main mechanisms for disease propagation will be presented:  
First, in Norway there was not identified that much uncertainty as for the countries in Western 
Africa. Ebola virus propagation starts with uncertainty around the source of the disease 
outbreak, and we can even see that the government officials in Western Africa performed 
“deliberate uncertainty-making” in an effort to postpone the “Declaration of a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern”. This worked, and the crisis was in fact formally 
postponed. 
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Next, mobilization of people, money and goods made combating the disease a challenge. It was 
worse for the affected countries in West Africa, than in Norway, as much logistics relied on 
general infrastructure, severely lacking for the Ebola-stricken countries. The need for 
professional health workers, the lack of funding to the WHO to combat disease, and the 
inadequate ability in distributing vaccines and goods being key elements.  
Thirdly, the international community has the power to affect competition between states, 
through restrictions on travel and trade. This will, together with the stigma associated from 
being an infected country, act as a disincentive to acknowledge the disease, and cooperating 
with other states. During both the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola outbreak it was unclear who 
had the topmost authority. In Norway this situation lasted throughout the crisis, while in 
Western Africa this was sorted out after some time. The main factors stemming from the WHO 
being inadequate in managing the Ebola outbreak are: lacking dialogue between top leaders and 
staff, no culture for risk taking in decision-making, unsuitable internal administrative rules on 
human resources and slow and lacking understanding of inter-agency leadership and 
coordination arrangements for health crises. Combined with a lack of awareness of the different 
frameworks between the health and humanitarian sectors, organizing a response become even 
harder, and in effect propagated the disease. 
Fourth, and last, there were great differences in communication with the public in Norway, 
compared to Western Africa. Norwegians are more trustful towards their own government, as 
it has not been involved in civil wars and atrocious violations against its population. Serious 
gaps in the early months of the Ebola outbreak, in terms of engaging with the local communities, 
made the WHO fail in establishing itself as the authoritative body on communicating about the 
Ebola crisis. Community resistance against the managers of the Ebola outbreak developed as a 
result of distrust, incorrectly conveyed messages, poor transparency, lack of listening to 
communities and inadequate planning – birthing the expression of “the people of the forest” as 
resistance against a cold biomedical power that was perceived as coming to harvest their organs 
and blood. 
5.0 CONCLUSION(S)  
Through a comparison of the H1N1 influenza in Norway and the Ebola outbreak in Western 
Africa, the research problem on what different reasons for pandemics, and mechanisms for 
disease propagation could be identified between Norway and Western Africa have been 
explored, discussed and answered.  
51 
Initially during the discussion, it was concluded that the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola outbreak 
were comparable, but that the Ebola outbreak was, somewhat, higher on the transboundary 
scale. Furthermore, while it was not initially the purpose of the research question, there surfaced 
some other findings when assessing whether the pandemics were comparable. The importance 
of having prepared a plan for delegating political authority and responsibility is one of them. 
The heavy reliance on the health sector showed how interconnected infrastructure is, and that 
health might be one of the most important sectors in securing community continuity. Finally, 
the WHO as custodians of a crisis is questioned, since it can lead to misinterpretation of the 
timeframe and how difficult a crisis should be to manage. 
Second, I argue that the relationship between Norway and Western Africa is that factors such 
as international travel, deforestation, migration and land use create breeding grounds that, non-
discriminately, can affect both developed and developing nations. The difference is that factors 
such as poverty, and absent or ineffective health and surveillance systems, will play a crucial 
role in facilitating the pandemic. It is pointed out that even though it is people in the rich 
countries that have the best chances in surviving an infection, the virus does not actually care 
how rich you are, naturally. If an outbreak is neglected, eventually it will spread to other parts 
of the world, developed nations as well. Thus, in order to solve a pandemic, it must be solved 
in the host country, or else it will only continue to serve as source of disease, spreading 
anywhere humans are. 
Finally, the mechanisms for disease propagation have been identified through the core 
challenges in a crisis. Uncertainty did play a crucial role as propagator of disease, mainly 
through trying to postpone the crisis, I labeled this action as “deliberate uncertainty-making”. 
Furthermore, challenges in mobilizing people, money and goods made disease combat a 
challenge. Another mechanism is the stigma associated with being the host country of a disease. 
Unclear national roles regarding authority and responsibility, and the WHO not being a crisis 
responder, but mainly a technical agency, propagated disease though slow and inadequate 
management. Lack of awareness of the different international frameworks between the health 
and humanitarian sectors gives more time for disease to spread. Last, the failure to establish an 
authoritative narrative in communicating disease led to community resistance against the one 
who were trying to help.  
The conclusions are based on the many points, findings and arguments made throughout the 
empirical investigation and discussion, summarized in Table 3 – Summary of finding
52 
Table 3 – Main findings in Norway/H1N1 and Western Africa/Ebola 
 
 Norway/H1N1 Western Africa/Ebola 
Transboundary 
scale 
Little international involvement, but national governance from top to 
bottom. A clear cut preparedness plan, dictating political and governing 
authorities. The crossing of functional borders was not a main concern, 
although there was involvement of some different sectors in the 
management. Shortcomings between when the crisis really happens and 
the WHO as the only custodians on defining an international health crisis. 
Very much international involvement from top to bottom in governance. Great 
spread of political boundaries. Lacking knowledge on responsibilities. Complete 
failure of health systems had great consequences on sectors like trade, tourism and 
education. Illustrates a high degree of interconnectedness between the health and 
other sectors. Shortcomings between when the crisis really happens and the WHO 
as the only custodians on defining an international health crisis. 
Reasons for 
pandemics 
Factors such as international travel, deforestation, migration and land use 
create breeding grounds for pandemics Introduction of a new strain of 
influenza virus. Slow termination through immunization. 
 
In addition to factors identified in Norway, poor health systems and poverty 
facilitate both likelihood and spread of emerging diseases. West African Ebola 
virus similar to previous outbreaks, other factors behind the increased cases. Slow 




Not much uncertainty about the source of the H1N1 infection in Norway, 
because early warnings. There was some uncertainty around the evolution 
of the crisis, linked to the virus being able to change its properties. The 
strategy to terminate the crisis was through immunization.  
 
It is pointed out that lack of competent personnel could be a problem. Not 
clear who has the authority to govern a planned surge workforce. Health 
Department gave signals that money should be spent on vaccines and extra 
medical equipment. Citizens had to pay for vaccine themselves. Problems 
with distributing the vaccine. 
 
The municipalities in Norway did not cooperate much. The Health 
Department appeared unclear in their role as the top response actor. There 
should be more formalization of roles during health emergencies. Transfer 
of responsibility in combating infectious disease to the chief municipal 
doctor can be problematic. Mostly managed within the health sector. 
 
Trust did not have to be established. The H1N1 was exaggerated, pointed 
out that the population can be scared into reacting. Great transparency, 
through the use of internet sites. Most Norwegians have prior knowledge 
of how the health system works. Press briefings were arranged, allowing 
for concerns and instant feedback. Use of social media. Predetermined 
plan for communicating with the public in health threats. 
Uncertainty about Ebola was complicated by factors such as weak health systems 
and poor surveillance, in addition governments tried to spread uncertainty in an 
attempt to postpone the crisis. Immunization was the final strategy to terminate the 
crisis, but there were great uncertainties around an already strained health system. 
  
There were crucial shortages in health workers and other qualified response 
personnel. Pre-exiting lack of health infrastructure contributed to shortage. The 
WHO being voluntarily funded and not being able to pay workers for weeks and 
months at the time. Problems with procuring health equipment. Closed borders. 
Expensive and scarce medication. General overall poor infrastructure. 
 
Problems in getting states to cooperate, disincentives for countries to report 
outbreaks. Lack of clarity over national administration and coordinating the 
response. The WHO propagated disease through being a too technical agency. Lack 
of awareness of the different frameworks between the health and humanitarian 
sectors. Use of military for health response, decreased trust in government. 
 
Highly distrustful population, active attempts at undermining trust. Ebola perceived 
as death sentence, incorrect communication. People did not seek out treatment 
centers. Poor transparency, spurring alternative interpretations of cause and 
propagation. The population did not feel that their concerns were listened to. 




Lenses, catastrophe, altruism and egoism 
While the initial research problem might seem quite obvious to answer, the answers being what 
might even be deemed naïve, I would argue that it is fruitful to ask these question from new 
perspectives. In any way, the aim of my thesis has been to explore pandemics through theory 
on crisis management. These lenses have told a story of modernization, interconnectedness, 
governance, inequity, health systems, pigs, bats, crisis management and an international 
harvester of blood. It has highlighted many aspects that might have been hidden through, for 
example, economic-driven, political, international relation or societal theory studies.  
Even though it should not be a surprise, it is quite surrealistic to think that it only takes one 
infected child, where there is lacking health systems, to almost force governments on their 
knees, launching national and international actions to combat an infectious disease. Virus 
mutation is random, and it is just pure chance that the H1N1 influenza or the Ebola virus did 
not mutate in a way that caused greater grievances for many more societies, developed nations 
included. How many times will a virus be able to originate from poor developing countries, and 
spread throughout the world, before one strain of virus actually have the potential to seriously 
damage global health? The United Nations stress that the emergence of such a virulent pathogen 
is entirely within the realm of possibility.  
The fact that there are great uncertainties regarding future health threats shows the importance 
of incorporating crisis management literature with pandemic and epidemic response. Questions 
regarding, for example, top-down or bottom-up management, myths regarding populations, risk 
communication, risk perception, and political, societal and cultural differences need to be 
addressed in order to be better prepared for the next pandemic. 
I would also like to highlight that both the H1N1 influenza and the Ebola outbreak are glaring 
signs for the world to help create basic medical surveillance and treatment facilities in the parts 
of the world that needs it the most. If not for altruistic reasons, the more developed nations 
should at least have it as motivation for protecting themselves. 
I suppose some would find it rather poetic that the creation of a modern world, and its inherent 
inequalities, could facilitate an unprecedented global cataclysm through a more contagious, and 
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1.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
After the initial search on “pandemics” in three of the better known journals on crisis 
management, I noticed that many researchers used “pandemic” and “epidemic” interchangeably 
when discussing them.  This is not in line with the definitions provided during the introduction 
of the thesis. Thus, I should take in consideration that many research papers regarding crisis 
management might be left out when limiting to only “pandemics”. This led me to also include 
“epidemics” in this literature review.  
As can be seen from Table 4, a total of 59 research papers were identified under “pandemics”, 
and an additional 108 research papers was included when searched with “epidemics”. 
Table 4 - Research papers related to crisis management   
Journal name Number of research papers in initial 
search on “pandemics” 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 35 
Disaster Prevention and Management 19 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 5 
Total: 59 
Journal name Number of research papers in initial 
search on “epidemics” 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 47 
Disaster Prevention and Management 55 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 5 
Total: 107 
 
This brings the total amount of research on “pandemics” and “epidemics”, in these three 
journals, to the number 139, after I removed the ones that showed up under both “pandemic” 
and “epidemic” (the overlap was in total 27 research papers). The years spanned from 1984 to 




While there seems to be somewhat substantial amount of research on health threats and crisis 
management (Table 5), it is actually quite few of these research papers that are explicitly about 
managing pandemics and epidemics. Most research papers only mention pandemics or 
epidemics, and are in fact about other themes, as shown in Table 6. 
Table 5 – Total number of relevant research papers   
Journal name Number of research papers 
combined (minus overlap) 
Years 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 67 (82-15) 1993-2016 
Disaster Prevention and Management 64 (74-10) 2008-2015 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 8 (10-2) 1984-2010 
Total: 139 (166-27) 1984-2016 
59 
Table 6 – Overview of themes  
Theme of study:  Author(s): 
Armed conflict and terrorism Fischer III, 1999 
Foxell, 1997  
Marktanner, Mienie & Noiset, 2015 
Perry, 2003 
Wachira, 1997 
Business continuity Pheng, Ying & Kumaraswamy, 2010 
Community response Hughes, 1993 
Consumer response Frank & Schvaneveldt, 2014 
Debris management Ekici, McEntire & Afedzie, 2009 
Drought Munro, 2006 
Earthquake Baytiyeh & Naja, 2013 
Gunn, 1995 
Economy Gehlich-Shillabeer, 2008 
Ethics Geale, 2012 
Extreme stress Gunderson, Crepeau-Hobson & Drennen, 2012 
Flood Abbas & Routray, 2014 
Forest fire Aini, Fakhur'l-Razi, Daud & Wahid 2006  
Czaja & Cottrell, 2014 
Fractal crisis Topper & Lagadec, 2013 
Human security Atienza, 2015 
Humanitarian assistance Benini, 1993 
Idris & Soh, 2014 
Hotel crisis management  Swalha, Jraisat & Al-Qudah, 2013 
Household water treatment Clasen, Smith, Albert, Bastable & Fesselet, 2006 
Incident command system Jensen & Waugh, 2014 
Industrial hazardous areas Caragliano & Manca, 2007 
Institutional failure Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006 
Interpretations van Laere, 2013 
Leadership Devitt & Borodzicz, 2008 
Jong, Dückers & van der Velden, 2016 
Learning Connolly, 2014 
Crichton, Ramsay & Kelly, 2009 
O’Brien, O’Keefe, Gadema & Swords, 2010 
Robert & Lajtha, 2002 
Linked crisis events Ren, 2000 
Mapping of hazards or risks, 
various trends of hazards or 
risks and the changing crisis 
Adivar & Selen, 2013 
Al-Madhari & Elberier, 1996 
Alexander, 2016 
Boin, 2005 
Bradford et al, 1994 
Eshghi & Larson, 2008 
Fritzon, Ljungkvist, Boin & Rhinard, 2007 
Helsloot & Jong, 2006 
Mohammed & Rahman, 1998 
Noji, 2001 
Pokhrel, Bhandari & Bhandari, 2009 
Rautela, 2006 
Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1993 
Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1996 
Ruggiero & Vos, 2013 
Shaluf, 2007 
Shaluf & Ahamdun, 2006 
Shiwaku, Shaw, Kandel, Shrestha & Dixit, 2006 
Smet, Lagadec & Leysen, 2012 
Turner, 1994 
Unlu, Kapucu & Sahin, 2010 
van Niekerk, 2015 
van Voorst, 2015 
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Mass death Phillips, Neal, Wikle, Subanthore & Hyrapiet, 2008 
Scanlon, 2008 
Scanlon & McMahon, 2011 
Scanlon, McMahon & van Haastert, 2007 
Media, communication, framing 
and information 
Arlikatti, Taibah & Andrew, 2014 
Bahir & Peled, 2015 
Baldini, Oliveri, Braun, Seuschek & Hess, 2012 
Bergeron & Cooren, 2012 
Buus & Olsson, 2006 
Cortiñas-Rovira, Pont-Sorribes & Alonso-Marcos, 2015 
Harro-Loit, Vihalemm & Ugur, 2012 
Friedman, Rose & Koskan, 2011 
Koskan, Foster, Karlis, Rose & Tanner, 2012 
Masys, 2004 
Newsom & Mitrani, 1993 
Nilsson, Alvinius & Enander, 2016 
Palttala & Vos, 2012 
Pan & Meng, 2016 
Veil, Buehner & Palenchar, 2011 
Multi-layered challenges Lagadec, 2004 
Organizations Lalonde, 2007 
Schulman, 2011 
Policy implications Ahn, Ha & Park, 2010 
Political perspectives Stark, 2010 
Preparedness and planning Ainuddin & Routray, 2012 
Brattberg, 2012 
Burns & Marx, 2014 
Burling & Hyle, 1997 
Frost, 1994 
Iles, 1994 
Mitchell et. al, 2016 
Olofsson, 2011 
Surjan & Shaw, 2009 
VanVactor, 2012 
Public-private partnership  Chen, Chen, Vertinsky, Yumagulova & Park, 2013 
Recovery and reconstruction Bates, & Peacock, 1989 
Cuny & Tanner, 1995 
Gupta & Sharma, 2006 
Régnier, Neri, Scuteri & Miniati, 2008 
Regime types Chan, 2014 
Seitz & Davis, 1984 
Zhang & She, 2014 
Riots Quarantelli, 1993 
Societal safety Olsen, Kruke & Hovden, 2007 
Symbols, rituals and power ’t Hart, 1993 
Vulnerability McEntire, 2012 
Nilsson, 2010 
 
Some research papers were not related to pandemics or epidemics at all, in total 14, because the 
word “epidemic” or “pandemic” were mentioned in their reference list.  
A majority of research papers that were about management of pandemics and epidemics were 
done so in the context of Western societies (Allen & Taylor, 2014; Baekkeskov & Rubin; 
Carrel, 2005; Connolly, 2015; Thorson & Ekdahl, 2005). Furthermore, many of the research 
papers are not proposing how to manage a pandemic or epidemic, but how different pandemics 
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and epidemics were managed, analyzed from different angles based on the whatever 
disciplinary school the researchers come from (Allen & Taylor, 2014; Benini & Bradford-
Benini, 1996; Connolly, 2015; ; Gstraunthaler, 2008; Neal & Younis, 2006; Sinha, 2000). 
Although it is interesting to see how pandemics and epidemics were managed, they do not write 
about how to manage in developing countries. Much of this research write about how existing 
systems for management failed (see for example Neal & Younis, 2006). I would argue that this 
is not quite transferable to developing countries, where the highest probability of epidemics and 
pandemics are. Many of these countries lack the necessary infrastructure or systems to manage 
health threats from, and is in need of international assistance. This is also noted by Benini & 
Bradford-Benini (1996) which points out that poverty, and low international status, makes the 
affected country rely on foreign organizations to respond to the epidemic. Noji (2001) further 
points out the sad irony that the countries with the most significant health threats are also the 
least capable of effectively dealing with them.  
Sinha (2000) proposes a framework for managing plague epidemic, which is not in the context 
of a Western society. It is based on a developing country and shows how the community itself 
should manage the health threat. While this research would seem to fit my criteria, it is only 
isolated to small scale management, and not pandemic proportions.  
I did, however, identify a few research papers that propose overarching models for natural 
hazards crisis management where epidemics and pandemics were mentioned briefly, but these 
do not focus explicitly on management of pandemics or epidemics. (Metri, 2005; Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006; Moe, Gehbauer, Senitz & Mueller, 2007; Kapucu, 2006). As this research 
is not built around empirical studies on epidemics or pandemics, but for example tsunami (Moe 
& Pathranarakul, 2006) or flood (Moe et. al., 2007), I am reluctant to propose them as 
framework for pandemic and epidemic management. Although there is a lack of pandemic and 
epidemic focus, there most certainly are elements from these studies that might be of interest 
for management practices. 
There are research papers in medical journals that have a variety of keywords like “pandemic 
response management”, “pandemic emergency management” or “epidemic response”, but most 
of these seem to be related to how isolation of the virus strain should be done, or the importance 
of vaccine creation. Although some mention quarantine as a measure to stop disease spread 
(Cox, Tamblyn & Tam, 2003; Fineberg, 2014; Layne, Monto & Taubenberger, 2009; Kelly, 
2010). It seems like the medical perspective on how to manage a pandemic, or epidemic, is seen 
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as how one should treat an illness in a patient, the patient being the region that is affected by a 
pandemic, or an epidemic. As seen in Table 7 there are 13 877 research papers that are related 
to “pandemic management”, and 23 126 related to “epidemic management”, combined over 37 
000 research papers. I also suspect that there is not so much overlap between pandemics and 
epidemics from the medical community, as they are more educated in medical science, and 
more strictly separate them. If I also were to include other key words like “pandemic response” 
or “epidemic emergency response” the number of research papers will grow even more. A 
larger review of the medical viewpoint in relation to crisis management and pandemics is thus 
needed to fully understand how the medical community believes a pandemic should be 
managed. The fact that most research on pandemics and epidemics are medical may not be 
surprising, but I would argue that a pandemic (and an epidemic) is more than an illness, it is in 
fact the management of a crisis, in which curing the illness is a part of it.  
Table 7 – Medical research papers   
Journal name Number of research papers on 
“pandemic management”  
Number of research papers 
on “epidemic management”  
The New England Journal of Medicine 174 3823 
Clinical Infectious Diseases 8810 10 851 
Journal of Infectious Diseases 4893 8452 
Total: 13 877 23 126 
 
A review study by Adivar & Selen (2013) of 74 publications shows that it is the field of biology 
and medicine that has researched epidemics the most. The aim most of these studies is to assess 
potential health implications. Further, epidemic management through vaccination and 
quarantine are the most proposed measures of control policies during epidemics. Because of 
this different focus of research between the social sciences and medical science, and the sheer 
amount of medical research papers on the subject, I have opted to not include medical research 
papers in this thesis. 
2.0 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WHO 
Between 1816 and 1899 there were six global cholera outbreaks, with origins from different 
parts of the world (Markel, 2014). The reason these pandemics came into action was by the 
growth of social and economic explosion from the industrial revolution. Steam-driven transport, 
railways and more open borders for trade meant people came much closer each other, and thus 
also their diseases (Clift, 2013).  Cholera posed great concerns to public health, and thus, an the 
first International Sanitary Conference were held in 1851 in France. The aim of this conference 
was to reach an agreement on minimum maritime quarantine requirements, while also 
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upholding international trade. Sadly, there were no scientific consensus that cholera was being 
spread from sick to healthy, instead there was a myriad of different theories on how cholera, 
and in general epidemics, spread (Clift, 2013; Markel, 2014). Many more conferences were 
held, but none of them managed to get to the ratification stage. It was not until 1892 that the 
first convention was ratified (7th International Sanitary Conference), resulting in maritime 
quarantine during cholera outbreaks, and only ships westbound from the East. In 1903 at the 
11th conference, plague and yellow fever were incorporated in one overarching convention. 
(Clift, 2013). These conventions can be seen as, at least in relative modern times, first public 
measures to manage pandemics. 
In 1907, the Office International d’Hygiène Publique was established in Paris with its main 
objective to collect and disseminate information on public health, particularly regarding 
cholera, yellow fever and plague (Clift, 2013; Markel, 2014). In the aftermath of the Second 
World War and the recognition of Hitler’s holocaust, and other atrocities committed by 
combatants, humanitarians and world leaders urged to put warfare to rest and instead focus on 
the development of effective and equitable economy. Political and public health measures that 
were fair for all people around the world was also of focus. It was with these ideas in mind that 
the United Nations was chartered in 1945, and soon, the World Health Organization (Markel, 
2014). The objective of the WHO is stated as “the attainment of all peoples of the highest 
possible level of health”. (WHO, 1948, p. 1). Equity in health standards being a key concept. 
Thus, through the world’s slow developmental realization of global health concerns, and the 
need for some kind of management thereof, the WHO became the leading organ when dealing 
with health-related issues. Gostin, Sridhar & Hougendobler (2015) underlines this point: 
“The Constitution unmistakably establishes the WHO as the premier global health leader, 
stating that it should ‘act as the directing and coordinating authority on international health 
work’ – working in close collaboration with UN agencies, national health ministries, and 
professional organizations (Article 2).” (Gostin et. al., 2015, p. 855). 
Many other researchers, and also the WHO itself, further points out the role the WHO plays in 
global health governance (Clift, 2013; Lidén, 2014; Markel, 2014; Ruger & Yach, 2009; WHO, 
2005).  
In 1951, the WHO member states adopted the International Sanitary Regulations. This 
regulation evolved into the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969. Further revision of 
the IHR was done in 1973, 1981, and finally in 2005 a fully revised version was adopted (WHO, 
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2015). The IHR is a result of the WHOs Constitution that gives it the authority to adopt 
regulations concerning sanitary and quarantine requirements, designed to prevent international 
spread of diseases (WHO, 1948). Furthermore, the IHR declares that its purpose it to prevent, 
protect, control and provide public health response to the international spread of diseases 
(WHO, 2005).  
In an interview with the New York Times, Director-General, Dr. Margaret Chan tells that it is 
not the WHOs task to respond to pandemics, but the affected country itself. The WHO should 
instead provide technical expertise: “First and foremost, people need to understand the WHO. 
The WHO is the UN specialized agency in health. And we are not the first responder. You know, 
the government has first priority to take care of their people and provide health care. The WHO. 
is a technical agency”. (Fink, 2014). Dr. Chan has “rephrased” herself in a later interview 
saying, “Disease outbreak response is, in fact, in our Constitution (Fink, 2015). Thus, also the 
leader of the WHO states that it is in fact the WHO that should manage pandemics, because no 
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